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SUBROGATION AND INDEMNITY RIGHTS UNDER THE
MINNESOTA NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE ACT
Since 1971, Minnesota and twenty-three other states have adopted no-
fault automobile insurance acts in response to the growing ineffective-
ness of the fault-based compensation system in dealing with losses
which arise out of motor vehicle accidents. Despite the no-fault label,
however, many of the acts, including the Minnesota Act, have retained
subrogation and indemnity rights for insurers and therefore have re-
tained the fault determination within the no-fault system. This Note
analyzes the effect of subrogation and indemnity rights on the Minne-
sota Act and suggests an alternative approach to compensate accident
victims without resort to the fault determination.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The advent of the twentieth century brought with it such things as
mass production, the automobile, and the automobile accident. For
nearly seven decades, claims arising out of these automobile accidents
were dealt with in the same manner, by recourse to the fault-based tort
compensation system. By the 1960's, the ineffectiveness of the fault-
based compensation system was apparent.' Four major problem areas
were identifiable. First, proving who was at fault was an immense, if not
impossible, task.2 Second, delays in compensating the injured party had
become characteristic of the system and served to aggravate the suffer-
ing of those injured in automobile accidents. 3 Third, an ever-increasing
slice of the insurance dollar was going for costs of administration and
litigation, not to the injured party.' Finally, when the insurance pro-
ceeds were paid to the injured party, the amount of compensation re-
ceived often bore no relation to the severity of the injury suffered.'
In search of a solution to problems arising out of the automobile
accident, twenty-four states have adopted no-fault automobile accident
reparation systems.' The no-fault system promises prompt payment to
1. See R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM 1 (1965).
2. Witnesses are inherently inaccurate, often due to the split-second nature of the
accident. When accidents are hit-and-run, the responsible party may not even be identi-
fied. When identifiable, the responsible party may be financially irresponsible with no
insurance and with insufficient assets to satisfy any claim held by the injured party. See
National No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act: Hearings on S. 354 Before the Comm.
on Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 181-82 (1973).
3. Before litigation or settlement, there are extensive investigations to attempt to estab-
lish fault. Long periods of negotiation may follow. Due to the ever-increasing number of
traffic accidents, court congestion is heavy with delays of up to three years common before
compensation is either received or denied. See R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, supra note 1,
at 1-2.
4. Less than one-half of every dollar is paid as compensation to the injured parties.
Thirty percent of insurance costs is attributable to litigation expenses and another thirty
percent goes to sales costs and other insurance company overhead. See No-Fault Motor
Vehicle Insurance: Hearings on H.R. Con. Res. 241 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce
& Finance of the Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1205
(1971).
5. Although absence of fault is theoretically a prerequisite to recovery, insurance com-
panies are acutely aware of the probability of a jury ignoring the judge's instruction on
fault. The result has been generous settlement of small and often unmeritorious claims
in an effort by the insurance companies to avoid litigation in the courts. See R. KEETON
& J. O'CONNELL, supra note 1, at 2. With the larger, more serious claims, delaying tactics
are utilized to force the injured party to settle. Pressing needs for medical treatment and
for everyday living expenses often force the severely injured individual to settle for an
amount far less than would be full compensation for injuries sustained. See id. at 2, 37-
38.
6. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-4014 to -4021 (Cum. Supp. 1975); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 10-4-
701 to -723 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-319 to -351a (West
Cum. Supp. 1976), as amended by Act of June 6, 1977, Pub. Act 77-369, 1977 Conn. Legis.
Serv. (West) 555, as amended by Act of July 12, 1977, Pub. Act 77-603, § 121, 1977 Conn.
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every injured party in an automobile accident for out-of-pocket losses,
without regard to which party was at fault.7
Legis. Serv. (West) 1266; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 3902 (1974); id. tit. 21, § 2118 (1974 &
Cum. Supp. 1976), as amended by Act of June 2, 1977, ch. 231, 1977 Del. Laws _; FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 627.730-.741 (West 1972 & Cum. Supp. 1976), as amended by Act of June
7, 1977, ch. 77-118, § 8, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. (West) 380, as amended by Act of July
5, 1977, ch. 77-468, §§ 31-38, 1977 Fla. Seas. Law Serv. (West) 1943; GA. COnE ANN. §§
56-3401b to -3413b (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1977); HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 294-1 to -41 (Supp.
1975), as amended by Act of May 12, 1976, Act 80, 1976 Haw. Sess. Laws 105, as amended
by Act of May 17, 1976, Act 114, 1976 Haw. Sess. Laws 204, as amended by Act of May
11, 1977, Act 73, 1977 Haw. Sess. Laws 126, as amended by Act of June 2, 1977, Act 166,
1977 Haw. Sess. Laws 333; KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-3101 to -3121 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1976),
as amended by Act of Apr. 15, 1977, ch. 28, §§ 5-6, 1977 Kan. Sess. Laws 203, as amended
by Act of May 10, 1977, ch. 164, Kan. Sess. Laws 610; Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 304.39-010 to
-340 (Cum. Supp. 1976); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 538-547 (Cum. Supp. 1977); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, §§ 34A-340 (West Cum. Supp. 1977); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 500.3101-3179 (West Cum. Supp. 1977), as amended by Act of July 5, 1977, Pub. Act
53, § 1, Mich. Legis. Serv. (West) 172, as amended by Act of July 6, 1977, Pub. Act 54,
Mich. Legis. Serv. (West) 174; MINN. STAT. §§ 65B.41-.71 (1976), as amended by Act of
May 20, 1977, ch. 188, 1977 Minn. Laws 311, as amended by Act of May 25, 1977, ch. 266,
1977 Minn. Laws 437, as amended by Act of May 26, 1977, ch. 276, § 3, 1977 Minn. Laws
476; NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 698.010-.510 (1973 & 1975), as amended by Act of Apr. 12, 1977,
ch. 165, 1977 Nev. Stats. 310, as amended by Ac of Apr. 23, 1977, ch. 244, § 17, Nev.
Stats. 441, as amended by Act of May 13, 1977, ch. 521, 1977 Nev. Stats. 1089, as amended
by Act of May 13, 1977, ch. 523, § 1, 1977 Nev. Stats. 1092; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 39:6A-1
to -20 (West 1973 & Cum. Supp. 1977); N.Y. INs. LAw §§ 670-678 (McKinney Cum. Supp.
1976), as amended by Act of Feb. 17, 1976 [sic], ch. 5, 1977 N.Y. Laws (McKinney) 14,
as amended by Act of Feb. 22, 1976 [sic], ch. 9, 1977 N.Y. Laws (McKinney) 16, as
amended by Act of July 6, 1977, ch. 404, § 2, 1977 N.Y. Laws (McKinney) 530, as amended
by Act of Aug. 11, 1977, ch. 892, §§ 6-15, 1977 N.Y. Laws (McKinney) 1831; N.D. CENT.
CODE ANN. 26-41-01 to -19 (Supp. 1977), as amended by Act of Apr. 19, 1977, ch. 252, §§
3-10, N.D. Seas. Laws 593, as amended by [Act of Apr. 19, 1977], ch. 253, N.D. Sess.
Laws 596; ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 743.786-.835 (1975), as amended by Act of __ , 1977,
ch. 600, § 3, 1977 Ore. Laws _; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1009.101-.701 (Purdon Cum.
Supp. 1977); S.C. CODE §§ 56-11-10 to -800 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1977); S.D. COMp. LAWS
ANN. §§ 58-23-6 to -8 (Supp. 1977); TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-3 (Vernon Pamphlet
Supp. 1975-1976); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 31-41-1 to -13.4 (1974 & Supp. 1977); VA. CODE §§
38.1-380.1, 46.1-497.1 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
7. The typical no-fault reparation plan entitles an individual to first-party benefits
from the no-fault insurer whenever personal injury is sustained in an accident arising out
of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle. Negligence and fault are largely immaterial,
at least in regard to the payment of initial benefits to the injured party. In exchange for
the payment of these benefits, the injured party forfeits the common law right to sue the
other party involved in the accident for compensation. This forfeiture normally is limited
to a specified dollar amount, above which the injured party retains a common law right
to sue for losses which are not compensated under the no-fault reparation plan.
The philosophy behind the no-fault system is a belief in the wisdom of providing the
most efficient, dignified, and certain form of financial and medical benefits for the victims
of vehicular accidents. Because insurance coverage is mandatory for the vehicle owner,
most accident losses can be paid from within the system. Thus, the system which causes
the injury pays for the losses incurred. The injured party is neither forced to rely on
public assistance nor left out in the cold. The burden of the losses is borne by the system
that is responsible for those losses rather than by the public in general.
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The Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act' was adopted by
the Minnesota Legislature in 1974.1 The purposes of the Act are clear.
The new compensation system is intended to relieve the severe economic
distress suffered by uncompensated automobile accident victims,'0 but
at the same time prevent overcompensation of those individuals suffer-
ing injuries in the accident." In addition, recovery from two sources for
the same injuries by an injured party is to be avoided.' 2 Moreover,
injured parties are encouraged to seek medical and rehabilitative treat-
ment by speedy administration of justice.'3
This Note considers two important and closely related aspects of the
Minnesota Act: rights of subrogation and indemnity granted an insurer
to claims arising out of an automobile accident.'" Affording subrogation
and indemnity rights has created uncertainties in the administration
and functioning of the new compensation system, as well as raising
public policy questions concerning the true character of the system and
its "no-fault" label. The operation of subrogation and indemnity rights
under a fault-based system will be analyzed first, 5 followed by a discus-
sion of their application in and effect on a no-fault system."6 A close look
will be taken at subrogation and indemnity rights under the Minnesota
Act.'7 Finally, questions of where the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile
Insurance Act is going, and where it should be going, will be explored.'"
II. SUBROGATION AND INDEMNITY UNDER A FAULT-BASED COMPENSATION
SYSTEM
To analyze the effect of subrogation and indemnity on the functioning
of the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act, their effect on
8. MINN. STAT. §§ 65B.41-.71 (1976), as amended by Act of May 20, 1977, ch. 188, 1977
Minn. Laws 311, as amended by Act of May 25, 1977, ch. 266, 1977 Minn. Laws 437, as
amended by Act of May 26, 1977, ch. 276, § 3, 1977 Minn. Laws 476.
9. See Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act, ch. 408, 1974 Minn. Laws 762
(amended 1975, 1976, and 1977) (codified as MINN. STAT. §§ 65B.41-.71).
10. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.42(1) (1976).
11. See id. § 65B.42(2).
12. See id. § 65B.42(5).
13. See id. § 65B.42(3)-(4),
14. For a comprehensive analysis of the effect of the tort thresholds on the functioning
of the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act, see Steenson, No-Fault in a Fault
Context: Tort Actions and Section 65B.51 of the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insur-
ance Act, 2 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 109 (1976). For a general discussion of the no-fault acts
in each state, see I. SCHERMER, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE, No-FAULT INSURANCE,
UNINSURED MOTORISTS, COMPULSORY COVERAGE (rev. ed. 1975). Compensation for property
damages has been left largely within the fault-based system by the state legislatures. It
will not be analyzed in this Note.
15. See notes 19-33 infra and accompanying text.
16. See notes 34-60 infra and accompanying text.
17. See notes 61-162 infra and accompanying text.
18. See notes 163-222 infra and accompanying text.
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and relation to the fault-based compensation system must first be deter-
mined.
The rights of subrogation and indemnity are independent and distinct
legal concepts. Indemnity is essentially equitable in nature and rests
upon the proposition that when one is compelled to discharge a duty or
pay a debt which in justice another ought to discharge or pay, the former
should be entitled to restitution from the latter."9 Indemnity is a right
independent of the insured's right to bring suit against the third party;"0
the insurer may assert its indemnity right against a third party in its
own name, without regard to any actions taken by its insured., In the
19. See Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, Inc., 251 F.2d 97,
99 (10th Cir. 1957); American Dist. Tel. Co. v. Kittleson, 179 F.2d 946, 951 (8th Cir.
1950); Samuelson v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 287 Minn. 264, 267, 178
N.W.2d 620, 623 (1970); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Reed Cleaners, 265 Minn. 503,
509, 122 N.W.2d 178, 182 (1963); Lunderberg v. Bierman, 241 Minn. 349, 352-54, 63
N.W.2d 355, 358-59 (1954). See also RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 76 (1937)
which reads:
A person who, in whole or in part, has discharged a duty which is owed by
him but which as between himself and another should have been discharged by
the other, is entitled to idemnity from the other, unless the payor is barred by
the wrongful nature of his conduct.
20. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 65B.53(1) (1976), as amended by Act of May 25, 1977, ch.
266, § 5, 1977 Minn. Laws 439. Under that provision, the vehicle insurer will have a
right to recover basic economic loss benefits paid to its insured from the insurer of a
commercial vehicle, the driver of which was the at-fault party in an accident. See note 85
infra. The injured insured, however, has no right to recover those basic economic loss
benefits from the insurer of the at-fault party. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.51(1) (1976), as
amended by Act of May 25, 1977, ch. 266, § 4, 1977 Minn. Laws 438. On the other hand,
had the accident occurred outside Minnesota in a state which has retained the fault
compensation system, the insured would have a right to recover those basic economic loss
benefits. The insurer would have both a subrogation right, see MINN. STAT. § 65B.53(2)
(1976), and the indemnity right referred to above if all other circumstances remained the
same.
21. Because the right inures directly to the insurer entitled to indemnity, that insurer
may bring the action against the third party in its own name without regard to any action
already taken or to be taken by its insured. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Reed Clean-
ers, 265 Minn. 503, 509, 122 N.W.2d 178, 182 (1963). The indemnity right thus may have
a dual appeal to the insurer. The claim may be prosecuted on the insurer's terms and will
not be subject to settlements effected by the insured, doctrines of res judicata or collateral
estoppel, or the like. For example, in American Mutual, the insurer attempted to exercise
an alleged right of indemnity on a workers' compensation claim. The liability for compen-
sation benefits by the employer, whom American Mutual insured, had accrued more than
six years earlier. Therefore, if American Mutual could only claim a subrogation right, the
statute of limitations would bar the suit. If an independent indemnity right existed,
however, the statute would not have started running until payment had actually been
made which was less than six years prior to the suit at hand. In denying American
Mutual's claim, the court discussed the distinction between the two rights, citing from a
previous court decision:
The provisions of the act subrogating the employer to the rights of the em-
ploye against third persons negligently or otherwise causing injury to him, create
no new right of action in either; such provisions serve only to place the employer
19781
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automobile accident context, an insurer, having paid out benefits to its
insured, thus is entitled to reimbursement from the at-fault third party
for those benefits.
22
A right of subrogation arises where the insured originally has a right
to seek damages from the third party.2 3 Upon compensating its insured
for all or part of the losses incurred, the insurer acquires any rights of
the insured to recover that portion of the claim from the third party."
Unlike the indemnity right, the subrogation right is not an independent
one. Because the insurer has compensated the insured for losses caused
by the third party, the insurer is entitled to exercise rights once held by
its insured. 25 The scope of the subrogation right to which the insurer is
entitled depends on the individual case. Where the insured has been
fully compensated for all losses suffered in the accident, the insurer will
possess subrogation rights to the full claim against the at-fault third
party.26 On the other hand, if the insured has remaining losses which
who pays the compensation in the first instance in the position of the employe
in respect to the remedies held against the third person. The employer thereby
acquires such rights and such rights only as were at the time vested in the
employe; nothing more, and nothing less.
Id. at 510, 122 N.W.2d at 183 (citing Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. St. Paul Gas Light Co., 152
Minn. 197, 199, 188 N.W. 265, 266 (1922)).
22. The right of indemnity, under the fault-based compensation system, was of little
value to the insurer in instances where its subrogation rights also could be invoked.
Because the injured insured possessed full tort rights against the at-fault third party, the
insurer often could invoke its subrogation rights in conjunction with litigation between the
insured and the third party, thereby saving time, money, and effort for both the insurer
and the insured. Through the use of subrogation, all claims could be resolved in one court
suit where all parties to the accident and their insurers were present.
23. See 16 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAw § 61:4 (2d ed. R. Anderson 1966);
R. HORN, SUBROGATION IN INSURANCE THEORY AND PRACTICE 5 (1964).
24. A suggested definition of subrogation is that "[ilt is a legal fiction through which
one who, not as a volunteer or in his own wrong and where there are no outstanding and
superior equities, pays the debt of another, is substituted to all the rights and remedies
of the other, and the debt is treated in equity as still existing for his benefit." Home
Owners' Loan Corp. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 Conn. 232, 238, 193 A. 769, 772 (1937)
(quoting First Taxing Dist. v. Gregory, 97 Conn. 639, 642, 188 A. 96, 97 (1922) (citation
omitted)).
25. See G. COUCH, supra note 23, § 61:4; R. HORN, supra note 23, at 5.
26. The insurer exercising a right of subrogation is substituted only to that portion of
its insured's claim that it has satisfied through payment of insurance proceeds. Therefore,
where the insurer has compensated its insured only for medical expenses incurred, the
insured retains the remaining claims against the at-fault third party for noneconomic
detriment, property damage, and any other losses arising out of the accident in question.
For example, MINN. STAT. § 65B.53(3) (1976) grants the no-fault insurer a right of subroga-
tion to claims of its insured based on intentional torts, on strict or non-no-fault statutory
liability, or on negligence other than negligence in the maintenance, use, or operation of
a motor vehicle. This right is limited, however, in that it exists "only to the extent that
basic economic loss benefits are paid or payable." Id. Any judgment awarded the insured
where the insurer has exercised its subrogation right will therefore be split between the
[Vol. 4
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have not been compensated by insurance, then the insurer will be enti-
tled only to a lien against the insured's judgment against the at-fault
third party to the extent compensation is paid by the insurer to the
insured.?
The rights of subrogation and indemnity serve a variety of functions
at common law. The exercise of either right places the burden of finan-
cial loss on the members of society who are at fault, that is, on those
who bear the legal responsibility for the injury."8 The party primarily
responsible for the losses incurred or injuries suffered is not thereby
unjustly enriched by the discharge of that responsibility by another
party.29 In addition, a subrogation right prevents excessive or double
recovery, reimbursing the insurer with judgment proceeds which might
otherwise bring a windfall to the insured. 30
The right of subrogation, and to a limited extent of indemnity, frees
an insurer to pay benefits to its insured which may or may not ulti-
mately be its responsibility to pay.31 Without such rights, insurers would
understandably be reluctant to pay benefits to their insureds until a
determination of liability has been made. With the rights of subrogation
and indemnity, however, the insurer can reimburse its insured and re-
cover from the third party if the third party is ultimately determined
to be at fault.
Subrogation and indemnity rights are important, then, to the effec-
tive functioning of a fault-based compensation system.32 The existence
of such rights allows insurers to compensate their insureds prior to any
insurer and the insured to the extent that the insurer has reimbursed its insured for
injuries suffered in the accident. See 16 G. CoucH, supra note 23, § 61:39.
27. See note 26 supra.
28. See R. HORN, supra note 23, at 24.
29. If the insurer is entitled to recover from the wrongdoer by way of subrogation, the
net result is that the insurer is only secondarily liable and the wrongdoer is primarily
liable, although with respect to the insured, the insurer is of course primarily liable on its
contract.
30. See R. HORN, supra note 23, at 25.
31. See R. HoRN, supra note 23, at 5.
32. The Minnesota Automobile Liability Study Commission in its report to the Minne-
sota Legislature in 1973 recommended the retention of the fault-based system, although
it recommended strengthening the add-on no-fault statute that Minnesota had already
adopted. The Commission therefore found retention of subrogation rights paramount as
is evidenced from the following excerpt from the Commission's report:
The "Commission" and the "O'Neill" Plans grant the first party insurer the
rights of subrogation and reimbursement, so that it may recover the benefits
paid out on a first-party basis to the victim from the liability carrier of the
tortfeasor in all cases where the victim's injury resulted from negligence. Such
a provision would preserve insurance rate variability based on the accident-
causing characteristics of the driver, and would distribute losses among insureds
on the basis of their likelihood to be negligent or to cause losses.
MINNESOTA AUTroMoILE LIABILrrY STrUY COMM'N, REPORT TO THE 1973 LEGISLATURE 79
(1973) (emphasis added).
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litigation of the fault question. Through the exercise of subrogation and
indemnity rights, the losses arising out of an automobile accident can
be shifted onto the party who bears the legal responsibility for the inju-
ries suffered. Additionally, the shifting of such losses allows insurers to
base premiums on the injury-causing capacity of the insured as a driver,
a basic tenet of the fault-based compensaton system s The rights of
subrogation and indemnity are designed, therefore, to secure an equita-
ble distribution of premium costs, shifting the burden of the loss onto
the at-fault party.
I. SUBROGATION AND INDEMNITY UNDER A No-FAULT COMPENSATION
SYSTEM
Twenty-four states have adopted automobile accident reparation
plans which provide some form of first-party coverage to insureds.' All
have been characterized as no-fault plans, yet most ultimately fix re-
sponsibility for the accident on the at-fault party or that party's insurer.
No two no-fault plans are identical, but they can be grouped into
three basic categories. A plan which is properly characterized as an
"add-on" plan provides first-party benefits5 to an insured but places
no restriction on the insured's right to sue in tort. 6 At the other end of
the spectrum, the "pure" no-fault plan, while also providing first-party
benefits, prohibits any tort action against the third party for losses up
to a specified dollar amount,37 referred to as the "tort threshold."
3 The
33. Id. Guido Calabresi explains the rate-making process of insurance companies as
follows:
Groups are divided into risk catagories. Premiums differ according to the pre-
sumed accident-proneness of each catagory, i.e. according to predicted accident
costs and according to whether the accident costs are likely to occur early or late.
People are generally invited to spread their losses only among those who are
thought to be roughly as accident prone as they. As a result, private insurance
charges some groups much more than others.
G. CALABPESi, THE COSTS OF AccmENTs 48 (1970) (footnote omitted).
34. For a listing of the states which have enacted no-fault reparation plans, see note 6
supra.
35. The term "first party benefits" may be used interchangeably with "basic economic
loss benefits." Whichever term is used, the benefits commonly reimburse an injured party,
or the heirs of a decedent, for medical expenses, income loss, replacement services loss,
funeral expenses, survivor's replacement services loss, and survivor's economic loss arising
out of the injury.
36. The following eight states have enacted add-on statutes: Arkansas, Delaware,
Maryland, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, and Virginia. For a citation to
the statutes, see note 6 supra.
37. The following sixteen states have pure or modified plans: Colorado, Connecticut,
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Ne-
vada, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Utah. The statutes as
enacted, however, do not fall readily into either category. For a citation to the statutes,
see note 6 supra.
38. The no-fault concept also alters the pattern of recovery for noneconomic loss. No
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third type of no-fault plan is a hybrid of the add-on and pure no-fault
concepts. It retains a modified fault determination, even below the tort
threshold, by affording the insurer either a right of subrogation, indem-
nity, or both.39 The insurer then may recover from the third party0 or
the third party's insurer," depending on the provision in the statute,
the amount of first party benefits paid, even though the insured may
have no corresponding right to bring suit against the third party for
those benefits."
A. Modification of the Pure No-Fault Concept by the Use of
Subrogation and Indemnity
Under a pure no-fault insurance plan, first-party insurance is com-
pulsory, requiring payment of basic economic loss benefits to the in-
sured as loss accrues.43 Payments are made without regard to fault, in
provision is made for the compensation of noneconomic loss by the no-fault insurance
plan. Instead, a level of loss or of injury must be met before the injured individual is
entitled to recover any damages for noneconomic detriment. Such is the tort threshold.
Each state has set its own specific threshold requirements in the statute it has enacted.
Provisions commonly range from a dollar threshold of economic loss which must be met
to schedules of various physical disabilities which must be suffered by the injured individ-
ual before a right to noneconomic damages accrues. For the tort threshold requirements
of all of the no-fault states, see Steenson, supra note 14, at 162-65.
39. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 627.730-.741 (West 1972 & Cum. Supp. 1976), as
amended by Act of June 7, 1977, ch. 77-118, § 8, 1977 Fla. Seas. Law Serv. (West) 380, as
amended by Act of July 5, 1977, ch. 77-468, §§ 31-38, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. (West)
1943; MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, §§ 34A-340 (West 1969 & Cum. Supp. 1977); MicH.
CoMp. LAws ANN. §§ 500.3101-.3179 (West Cum. Supp. 1977), as amended by Act of July
5, 1977, Pub. Act 53, § 1, Mich. Legis. Serv. (West) 172, as amended by Act of July 6,
1977, Pub. Act 54, Mich. Legis. Serv. (West) 174; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1009.101-.701
(Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977).
40. In the context of this Note, the insured under an insurance contract is the "first
party" and the insurer is the "second party." The insurer of the third party becomes the
third party insurer, although between themselves they are the first and second parties to
the insurance contract they have entered into.
41. See note 40 supra.
42. Where, for instance, the insurer is granted an indemnity right against the at-fault
party's insurer, see, e.g., Act of May 25, 1977, ch. 266, § 5, 1977 Minn. Laws 439 (amending
MINN. STAT. § 65B.53(1) (1976)), the injured insured will have no corresponding claim to
those basic economic loss benefits which the insurer may recover from the at-fault party's
insurer. See notes 19-22 supra and accompanying text.
43. The no-fault concept was proposed in concrete form by Robert Keeton and Jeffrey
O'Connell. See R. KEEToN & J. O'CoNNELL, supra note 1. Their proposed Basic Protection
Plan eliminates all right of subrogation afforded the insurer under the common law tort
reparation system. Basic economic loss benefits payable to the insured are not recoverable
by the insurer in a tort action.
Special provision for subtraction of overlapping benefits is made when dealing with a
party other than a basic protection insured. See id. at 307 (Motor Vehicle Basic Protection
Insurance Act § 1.10(c)(2)). This is done to protect the basic protection insured from
bearing the tort liability of a party not covered under the proposed no-fault plan, or of an
uninsured motorist who is legally required to obtain coverage but fails to do so. These
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exchange for a tort liability exemption of a specified dollar amount."
Recovery of general damages in cases involving only minor injury to the
insured is prohibited.45 The insured cannot institute a tort action for
basic economic loss benefits paid and in turn cannot be sued for those
same benefits should the insured be the party who would be at fault in
a common law tort action." This tort exemption is comprehensive, pro-
parties have no tort exemption under the plan and an injured party may otherwise obtain
full tort recovery for injuries sustained. Any basic economic loss benefits recovered by the
insured in such an instance are subtracted from the net loss payments which the insurer
is otherwise responsible to pay its insured. See id.
Provision is made for full tort recovery against other than basic protection insureds so
as not to place an unfair burden on those covered by and paying for no-fault benefits.
Otherwise, increased premiums to the insured would result while affording an exemption
from tort liability to those not covered by the no-fault plan. Subtraction of overlapping
benefits is preferrable to subrogation provisions because they avoid the expense of subro-
gation proceedings and leave the control of the tort claim with the insured. Provision is
thus made to prevent double recovery, thereby reducing the cost of basic protection to the
insured public. Id. at 404.
Indemnity is afforded an insurer in two instances. The right arises when an insurer is
dealing either with a third party who intentionally causes injury or with a converter who
causes injury through use of the converted vehicle. See id. at 317 (Motor Vehicle Basic
Protection Insurance Act § 2.8(a)). Reimbursement extends to the full cost outlay of the
insurer including reasonable and necessary costs of processing the claim along with attor-
ney's fees, again to prevent basic protection insureds from footing the bill.
The insurer will be afforded an additional right of indemnity against the third party or
the third party's insurer who had notice of a right of reimbursement existing in the insurer
but who nonetheless paid the judgment or settlement to the insured without a joint payee
provision or the consent of the insurer. See id. (Motor Vehicle Basic Protection Insurance
Act § 2.8(b)). The right exists to the extent of reimbursement to which the insurer is
entitled but cannot collect from its insured. For example, Insurance Company 1 insures
A who is injured in an automobile accident. B, also involved in the accident, is at fault
and is uninsured. A therefore retains full common law rights against B. Before A obtains
any judgment against B, A is fully compensated for injuries suffered by its insurer, Insur-
ance Company 1. Later, B, who knows of Insurance Company I's right to reimbursement,
pays A the full judgment which A obtained after receiving compensation from its insurer.
A then leaves town and cannot be located. Since Insurance Company 1 is entitled to
reimbursement from A for at least part of the judgment recovered from B, Insurance
Company 1 may seek indemnification for that amount from B. B had notice of A's right
of reimbursement and is liable for Insurance Company l's losses.
Affording the insurer reimbursement and indemnity rights under these circumstances
does not defeat the concept of a pure no-fault system. The common law reparation system
developed to settle fault-based accident claims. The rights are afforded under the Basic
Protection Plan only where there has been an intentional wrongful act by a third party or
where there has been negligence or fault unrelated to the accident itself. Pure no-fault
plans are intended to correct the imbalances of a system where accidents which occur are
basically unavoidable, happening for lack of due care but not because of any conscious
wrongdoing on the part of the parties involved in the accident.
44. See id. at 274-77.
45. See id.
46. See id.
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hibiting any action by the insurer against the at-fault party, as well as
prohibiting action by the insured.'7
The inclusion of subrogation and indemnity rights within the no-fault
system, however, modifies the tort exemption so it is no longer absolute.
Under the common law, the right of indemnity is based on a derivative
liability. The insurer pays its insured for an injury which is the primary
obligation of a third party. On the theory that the third party should
be responsible for primary obligations, the insurer is entitled to indem-
nification from the third party.48 Payments of basic economic loss bene-
fits under a no-fault plan, however, are the responsibility of the insurer
of the injured party, not the responsibility of a third party, regardless
of which party was at fault." The insurer under the insurance contract
promises to pay the insured directly for any injury which the insured
sustains, and thus incurs a primary obligation. C6nsequently, the in-
surer has no common law right of indemnity.
The right of an insurer to be indemnified by the at-fault third party
has been retained statutorily, however, in many of the present no-fault
statutes, despite the fact that the insurer's liability is now primary and
not derivative. Retention of the indemnification concept has been
achieved in several different ways. Where the insured is excluded from
tort recovery against the third party, the insurer in some states has been
granted the right of indemnity against the third party if the third party
would otherwise be liable but for the tort exemption.5 Other states have
further limited the indemnification right by restricting the insurer's
recourse only against the insurer of the third party and not against the
third party directly." The right of indemnity has been retained statuto-
rily in other states only where a commercial vehicle was involved in the
accident.52
The indemnity rights provided under the various no-fault plans cover
47. See id.
48. See notes 19-22 supra and accompanying text.
49. See R. KaEMoN & J. O'CoNNELL, supra note 1, at 274.
50. See CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-4-713(2) (1973) (insurer of private passenger vehicle
afforded indemnity right against owner, user, operator, or any other person or organization
legally responsible for the acts or omissions of such person); NEV. REV. STAT. §
698.290(2)(a) (1975) (indemnity right against at-fault third party granted insurer to extent
insurer has paid basic economic loss).
51. N.Y. INS. LAw § 674 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1976) (insurer entitled to indemnifica-
tion from insurer of at-fault third party only through submission of claim to mandatory
arbitration); ORE. REV. STAT. § 743.825 (1975) (insurer of at-fault third party required to
reimburse insurer who has paid basic economic loss benefits to its insured); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 31-41-11(1) (1974) (insurer entitled to reimbursement from insurer of at-fault third
party, with liability to be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration).
52. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 65B.53(1) (1976), as amended by Act of May 25, 1977, ch.
266, § 5, 1977 Minn. Laws 439 (indemnity right granted only against insurer of at-fault
driver of commercial vehicle).
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a broad spectrum. In some states the right is a fairly extensive one,53 in
others the right has been severely restricted. Wherever statutory in-
demnity is granted, however restricted it may be, the at-fault party
must ultimately be determined. This must be done to establish which
insurer discharged a duty that the law has determined should be the
responsibility of another. In the automobile accident context, the law-
makers, by including a right of indemnity, have determined that the
party who caused the accident, or that party's insurer, shall be' held
responsible for all losses and injuries arising out of the accident in ques-
tion. Thus, the expensive and slow process of determining which party
was at fault must occur. Rights of indemnity, then, are granted to insur-
ers to prevent third parties and their insurers from escaping a responsi-
bility which, but for the no-fault plan, would be theirs.
Subrogation rights also have been retained in many no-fault statutes.
Achieving an equitable distribution of losses, a major purpose of the no-
fault concept, is frustrated when an insured is allowed to recover first
from an insurer and later from the at-fault third party for those same
losses. 5 By permitting the insurer a right of subrogation, the possibility
of a windfall double recovery is virtually eliminated."
The elimination of the possibility of double recovery by an insured can
be accomplished by means other than through subrogation. Three possi-
ble alternatives to subrogation exist. Some no-fault plans require sub-
traction of basic economic loss benefits received by an insured from the
total tort judgment awarded that insured in a common law action aris-
53. See, e.g., CoL. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-4-713 (1973); NEv. REV. STAT. § 698.290(2)
(1975); N.Y. INS. LAW § 674 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1976); ORE. REV. STAT. § 743.825
(1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-41-11(1) (1974).
54. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 65B.53(1) (1976), as amended by Act of May 25, 1977, ch.
266, § 5, 1977 Minn. Laws 439.
55. See generally R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, supra note 1, at 256-72.
56. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 56-3405b(d)(1) (1977) (subrogation right permitted in-
surer, to extent of benefits provided, only after insured has been fully compensated for
all economic and noneconomic losses arising out of accident); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
90, § 34M (West Cum. Supp. 1977) (insurer entitled to subrogation right only to extent
of benefits paid); MINN. STAT. § 65B.53(2)-(3) (1976) ("This right of subrogation exists
only to the extent that basic economic loss benefits are paid or payable and only to the
extent that recovery on the claim absent subrogation would produce a duplication of
benefits or reimbursement of the same loss."); cf. HAW. REV. STAT. § 294-7 (Supp. 1975)
(subrogation right granted for 50% of basic economic loss benefits paid).
Exercise of the subrogation right granted an insurer under a no-fault plan also reallo-
cates losses to the at-fault party or the at-fault party's insurer. The insurer recovers sums
of money which it has paid to its insured. In the no-fault context, such sums are the first-
party basic economic loss benefits which are paid, at least initially, without regard to fault
in the accident out of which the losses arose. To recover such monies, the insurer in its
subrogation claim must prove that the third party was at fault and therefore should be
held responsible for the losses arising therefrom. As with the exercise of an indemnity
right, fault must be determined so the responsible party can be identified.
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ing out of the automobile accident.5 1 In other states, the injured party
cannot introduce evidence of any losses incurred by that party which
have been reimbursed by the insurer.58 The damage issue in the tort
action against the third party, therefore, is a limited one; the injured
insured may recover only general damages, such as pain and suffering,
loss of consortium, and loss of earning capacity." A third method of
preventing double recovery affixes a lien in favor of the insurer on any
tort recovery secured by the insured to the extent of basic economic loss
benefits paid. 0 Such a provision allows the insured to exercise full con-
trol over the litigation but eliminates the possibility of any double recov-
ery.
The subrogation right and the three alternatives outlined above all
achieve their major purpose: elimination of double recovery by the in-
sured. The ramifications of each alternative, however, differ drastically.
No-fault plans which afford a right of subrogation to the insurer, or affix
a lien in favor of the insurer on any tort judgment awarded an insured,
serve to reallocate the losses back upon the at-fault party.-Despite the
no-fault label, a fault determination is necessary to reallocate the losses
upon the at-fault party. The other alternatives preclude recovery of
basic economic loss benefits by either the insured or the insurer from
the at-fault party. The result is that there is no reallocation of losses,
and, at least as to the basic economic loss benefits paid initially, there
need not be a fault determination.
In conclusion, subrogation and indemnity rights fulfill the same pur-
pose in a no-fault compensation system as they did in a fault-based
compensation system. Double recovery by an insured is prevented
through the exercise of a subrogation right by the insurer. Exercise of
an indemnity right shifts the losses arising out of the automobile acci-
dent to the at-fault party or to that party's insurer. Together, they
preserve the essential fault characteristics of the fault-based compensa-
tion system.
57. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.736(3) (West Cum. Supp. 1976) (no right by insurer or
insured to recover for injuries for which basic economic loss benefits have been paid or
are payable); MNN. STAT. § 65B.51(1) (1976), as amended by Act of May 25, 1977, ch.
266, § 4, 1977 Minn. Laws 438 (basic economic loss benefits paid or to be paid to an insured
deducted from judgment award in negligence action against at-fault third party).
58. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2118(g) (1974) (individual eligible for basic economic
loss benefits under Act precluded from pleading or introducing into evidence in an action
against at-fault third party those losses for which compensation is available); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 39:6A-12 (West 1973) (same).
59. Limitation of the damage issue also keeps the loss figure lower and hopefully makes
small pain and suffering claims less attractive to pursue because those claims become
economically less worthwhile. See R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, supra note 1, at 274-76.
60. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-4019 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (insurer entitled to reimburse-
ment for basic economic loss benefits paid, through lien against insured's judgment
against at-fault third party); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-325(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1976)
(same).
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IV. SUBROGATION AND INDEMNITY UNDER THE MINNESOTA NO-FAULT
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE ACT
Minnesota enacted a plan of no-fault automobile insurance, effective
January 1, 1975, during its annual legislative session in 1974.1 Adopted
after long debate and compromise, 2 the resulting statute was an amal-
gamation of various proposals, but may be categorized as a modified no-
fault plan. 3 This statute replaced a fault-based compensation system,
which required insurance companies to offer supplementary first party
coverage to their .insureds.4 That coverage was essentially the same as
an add-on no-fault plan," except that under Minnesota law the coverage
was optional rather than mandatory.6
A. The Rights of Subrogation and Indemnity in General
The significance and impact of subrogation and indemnity rights on
a no-fault insurance plan are nowhere better illustrated than in the
Minnesota law." Since its adoption on April 11, 1974, the statute's
61. See Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act, ch. 408, 1974 Minn. Laws 762
(amended 1975, 1976, and 1977) (codified as MINN. STAT. §§ 65B.41-.71).
62. Numerous proposals were considered and utilized in formulating the final legisla-
tive enactment. The original bill introduced in the senate was the UNIFORM MOTOR VSII:
cLz Accswzr REPARATIONS Acr (hereinafter UMVARA). See notes 205-22 infra and accom-
panying text. Various amendments were submitted and many adopted which drew from
the Keeton and O'Connell plan, see note 43 supra, and from proposals for retaining and
strengthening the existing fault-based system made in MINNESOTA AUToMOBILE LIABILrrY
STUDY CoMM'N, REPORT TO THE 1973 LEGISLATURE 16-27 (1973). See also 3 MINN. H.R. JoUR.
4643-46 (1974); 1 MINN. S. JoUR. 1726-27 (1973).
63. The plan finally adopted, although a compromise, turned out to be one of the
stronger no-fault acts to have been passed to date. Tort thresholds, below which suits for
general damages are prohibited, are set at $2,000, see MINN. STAT. § 65B.51(3)(a) (1976),
coverage for basic economic loss benefits is mandatory to $30,000, see id. § 65B.44(1), and
insurance companies are required to offer additional optional coverage to their insureds,
see id. § 65B.49(6), as amended by Act of May 25, 1977, ch. 266, § 3, 1977 Minn. Laws
438, as amended by Act of May 26, 1977, ch. 276, § 3, 1977 Minn. Laws 476. The Commis-
sion's proposal to require arbitration for all tort claims under $5,000 was originally
adopted, see Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act, ch. 408, § 12, 1974 Minn.
Laws 776 (repealed 1975), but has since been altered to make the mechanism available
but not mandatory. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.525 (1976).
64. See Act of May 24, 1969, ch. 713, 1969 Minn. Laws 1272 (repealed 1974).
65. Supplementary first-party coverage included uninsured motorist coverage which
was mandatory for private passenger vehicles. See Act of May 23, 1969, ch. 630, 1969
Minn. Laws 1087 (amending MINN. STAT. § 72A.149 (1967), current version at MINN. STAT.
§ 65B.49(4) (1976), as amended by Act of May 25, 1977, ch. 266, § 2, 1977 Minn. Laws
437). Also offered were $10,000 in accidental death benefits for the named insured, see Act
of May 24, 1969, ch. 713, § 3, 1969 Minn. Laws 1273 (repealed 1974), wage loss indemnity
of $60 per week payable for up to a period of one year, see id., and underinsured motorist
coverage with limits equal to those of the liability coverage. See Act of May 27, 1971, ch.
581, 1971 Minn. Laws 1082 (repealed 1974).
66. See Act of May 24, 1969, ch. 713, § 2, 1969 Minn. Laws 1273 (repealed 1974).
67. The subrogation and indemnity provisions of the Act were also a product of a
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subrogation and indemnity provisions have undergone major revision
twice, in 197668 and again in 1977.9 The revisions have come in an
apparent attempt to bring the Act more into line with the purposes of
no-fault70 and to correct inaccuracies and close loopholes in the Act's
compromise plan which was negotiated when the two houses proposed and passed widely
differing plans. The proposal of the House of Representatives, passed January 31, 1974,
see 3 MINN. H.R. JOUR. 4653 (1974), allowed an insurer direct subrogation to any claims
held by its insured against a third party operating a motor vehicle without security under
the plan, against a third party where the injury caused was the result of an intentional
tort, or where there was a cause of action based on strict or statutory liability. The right
afforded was to the extent of benefits paid by the insurer and only to prevent double
recovery.
In situations where an insured would be liable in tort, but for the tort exemptions
provided by the Act, the other insurer was afforded a right of indemnity against the in-
surer of the at-fault party. Reimbursement under the House plan would have been for
whichever of the following amounts was less: basic economic loss benefits paid out by the
insurer entitled to reimbursement, the liability limits of the insurance policy of the at-
fault party, or the amount of damages for which the at-fault party would be liable in a
tort action. Determination of which insurer was entitled to reimbursement and in what
amount was subject to mandatory, good faith, binding, interinsurer arbitration.
The Senate plan, passed May 9, 1973, adopted virtually intact the UMVARA proposal,
see notes 205-22 infra and accompanying text, including the exact reimbursement, subro-
gation and indemnity provisions and the loss allocation system which makes the UM-
VARA plan revolutionary. See 2 MINN. S. JouR. 2525-29 (1973). Had this been adopted,
Minnesota's reparation system for automobile accidents would have been moved far be-
yond any no-fault act adopted by a state, completely rejecting the fault concept as a
method of allocating loss.
68. See Act of Mar. 25, 1976, ch. 79, 1976 Minn. Laws 201 (amending MINN. STAT. §
65B.53 (1974)).
69. See Act of May 25, 1977, ch. 266, § 5, 1977 Minn. Laws 439 (amending MINN. STAT.
§ 65B.53(1) (1976)).
70. The legislature included within the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act
a purpose clause to aid in the interpretation of individual sections of the Act in a manner
consistent with the overriding purposes for which the plan was adopted. MINN. STAT. §
65B.42 (1976) states:
The detrimental impact of automobile accidents on uncompensated injured
persons, upon the orderly and efficient administration of justice in this state,
and in various other ways requires that Laws 1974, Chapter 408 be adopted to
effect the following purposes:
(1) To relieve the severe economic distress of uncompensated victims of
automobile accidents within this state by requiring automobile insurers to offer
and automobile owners to maintain automobile insurance policies or other
pledges of indemnity which will provide prompt payment of specified basic
economic loss benefits to victims of automobile accidents without regard to
whose fault caused the accident;
(2) To prevent the overcompensation of those automobile accident victims
suffering minor injuries by restricting the right to recover general damages to
cases of serious injury;
(3) To encourage appropriate medical and rehabilitation treatment of the
automobile accident victim by assuring prompt payment for such treatment;
(4) To speed the administration of justice, to ease the burden of litigation
on the courts of this state, and to create a system of small claims arbitration to
15
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provisions. Rights of subrogation and indemnity are closely intertwined
under the Act and their overall impact cannot be accurately determined
without considering the two together. Initially, however, for purposes of
simplicity, the status of subrogation and indemnity under the Act from
January 1, 1975 to the present will be considered separately.
1. The Right of Subrogation
The Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act,7' as originally
adopted, granted a right of subrogation to an insurer in any civil action
instituted by its insured arising out of an automobile accident." The
subrogation right existed only to the extent of basic economic loss bene-
fits paid by the insurer. In any action against the at-fault third party,
the insured could recover general damages and the insurer could recover
the basic economic loss benefits which it had previously paid to its
insured. However, if the insurer failed to exercise its right of subroga-
tion, the insured could not recover the basic economic loss benefits from
the at-fault third party.73 The subrogation right granted under the stat-
ute differed, therefore, from the common law right of subrogation. The
right under the statute was essentially a hybrid of the common law
rights of subrogation and indemnity. Only the insurer could recover the
basic economic loss benefits from the at-fault third party, but the in-
surer had to wait for the insured to commence a civil action against the
third party before it could do so. In addition, a subrogation right was
provided an insurer when its insured had a claim based on an inten-
tional tort or on strict or non-no-fault statutory liability, to the extent
of benefits paid and only to prevent double recovery by its insured."
The right of subrogation upon institution of a civil action for general
damages, however, was eliminated by the legislature in 1976.11 Today,
subrogation rights are granted an insurer when its insured is involved
decrease the expense of and to simplify litigation, and to create a system of
mandatory inter-company arbitration to assure a prompt and proper allocation
of the costs of insurance benefits between motor vehicle insurers;
(5) To correct imbalances and abuses in the operation of the automobile
accident tort liability system, to provide offsets to avoid duplicate recovery, to
require medical examination and disclosure, and to govern the effect of advance
payments prior to final settlement of liability.
71. See Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act, ch. 408, 1974 Minn. Laws 762
(amended 1975, 1976, and 1977) (codified as MINN. STAT. §§ 65B.41-.71).
72. See Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act, ch. 408, § 13, 1974 Minn. Laws
776 (amended 1976 and 1977) (codified as MINN. STAT. § 65B.53).
73. See Act of May 25, 1977, ch. 266, § 4, 1977 Minn. Laws 438 (amending MINN. STAT.
§ 65B.51(1) (1976)).
74. See Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act, ch. 408, § 22, 1974 Minn. Laws
781 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 65B.53(3) (1976)).
75. See Act of Mar. 25, 1976, ch. 79, 1976 Minn. Laws 201 (amending MINN. STAT. §
65B.53(2) (1974)).
[Vol. 4
16
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [1978], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol4/iss1/4
SUBROGATION AND INDEMNITY
in an accident occurring out-of-state, to the extent of basic economic
loss benefits paid, and, again, only to prevent double recovery." The
insurer now has a right of subrogation, for example, where the accident
occurs in a non-no-fault state or in a no-fault state allowing tort recovery
for basic economic loss benefits once the threshold requirements have
been met. The 1976 amendments also retained the right of subrogation
when an insured's claim is based upon an intentional tort or on strict
or non-no-fault statutory liability." Additionally, a loophole in the Act
was closed by further granting the insurer a subrogation right where its
insured has a claim based on negligence other than negligence arising
out of the maintenance, use, or operation of a motor vehicle."
2. The Right of Indemnity
A right of indemnity was statutorily retained under the original Min-
nesota Act. The right was granted the insurer only when a commercial
vehicle was involved in the accident." There was no requirement that
the commercial vehicle be driven by the at-fault party in the accident,
only that a commercial vehicle be involved.8" Once involvement of a
commercial vehicle was established, an insurer was entitled to indemni-
fication from any third party's insurer, if that third party would have
76. See id. Subdivision 2 of section 65B.53 now reads:
A reparation obligor paying or obligated to pay basic or optional economic loss
benefits is subrogated to the claim for the recovery of damages for economic loss
that the person to whom the basic or optional economic loss benefits were paid
or payable has against another person whose negligence in another state was the
direct and proximate cause of the injury for which the basic economic loss
benefits were paid or payable. This right of subrogation exists only to the extent
that basic economic loss benefits are paid or payable and only to the extent that
recovery on the claim absent subrogation would produce a duplication of bene-
fits or reimbursement of the same loss.
MINN. STAT. § 65B.53(2) (1976).
77. Compare Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act, ch. 408, § 22, 1974 Minn.
Laws 781 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 65B.53(3) (1976)) with Act of Mar. 25, 1976,
ch. 79, § 1, 1976 Minn. Laws 202 (codified as MINN. STAT. § 65B.53(3) (1976)).
78. Compare Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act, ch. 408, § 22, 1974 Minn.
Laws 781 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 65B.53(3) (1976)) with Act of Mar. 25, 1976,
ch. 79, § 1, 1976 Minn. Laws 201. Subdivision 3 of section 65B.53 now reads:
A reparation obligor paying or obligated to pay basic economic loss benefits is
subrogated to a claim based on an intentional tort, strict or statutory liability,
or negligence other than negligence in the maintenance, use, or operation of a
motor vehicle. This right of subrogation exists only to the extent that basic
economic loss benefits are paid or payable and only to the extent that recovery
on the claim absent subrogation would produce a duplication of benefits or
reimbursement of the same loss.
MINN. STAT. § 65B.53(3) (1976).
79. See Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act, ch. 408, § 13, 1974 Minn. Laws
776 (amended 1976 and 1977) (codified as MiN. STAT. § 65B.53).
80. See id.
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been liable but for the tort exemption authorized by the Act."' Fault was
determined and indemnification was granted exclusively through man-
datory, good faith, binding, interinsurer arbitration."
Under the 1976 amendments, the right to indemnification afforded an
insurer when an accident involved a commercial vehicle remained the
same as under the original law.13 In 1977, however, the legislature signifi-
cantly narrowed the scope of the indemnity right granted insurers under
the Minnesota Act."4 As the statute reads today, a right of indemnity is
available only against the insurer of the commercial vehicle involved in
the accident, if the party driving the commercial vehicle is found to be
the at-fault party. 5 The indemnity right is no longer available to all
insurers merely upon the involvement of a commercial vehicle in the
accident.
3. Special Problems with Section 65B.51, Subdivision 1
Until August 1, 1977, one glaring problem with the subrogation and
indemnity provisions of the Act existed. On their face, the subrogation
and indemnity rights were forthright and clear. A severe limitation on
the full right of indemnity and the limited right of subrogation afforded
an insurer, however, arose from the last sentence of section 65B.51,
subdivision 1, which read: 8
This subdivision shall not bar subrogation and indemnity recoveries
under section 13 [Minn. Stat. § 65B.53], subdivisions 1 and 2, if the
injury had the consequences described in subdivision 3 [of exceeding
the tort thresholds] and a civil action has been commenced in the
manner prescribed in applicable laws or rules of civil procedure to
recover damages for noneconomic detriment.
81. See id.
82. See Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act, ch. 408, § 13, 1974 Minn. Laws
777 (renumbered as MINN. STAT. § 65B.53(4) (1976)).
83. Compare Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act, ch. 408, § 13, 1974 Minn.
Laws 776 (amended 1976 and 1977) (codified as MINN. STAT. § 65B.53) with Act of Mar.
25, 1976, ch. 79, § 1, 1976 Minn. Laws 201 (amended 1977).
84. See Act of May 25, 1977, ch. 266, § 5, 1977 Minn. Laws 439 (amending MINN. STAT.
§ 65B.53(1) (1976)).
85. See id. Subdivision 1 of section 65B.53 now reads:
A reparation obligor paying or obligated to pay basic or optional economic
loss benefits is entitled to indemnity subject to the limits of the applicable
residual liability coverage from a reparation obligor providing residual liability
coverage on a commercial vehicle if negligence in the operation, maintenance
or use of the commercial vehicle was the direct and proximate cause of the in-
jury for which the basic economic loss benefits were paid or payable to the
extent that the insured would have been liable for damages but for the deduc-
tion provisions of section 65B.51, subdivision 1.
Id.
86. Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act, ch. 408, § 11, 1974 Minn. Laws 774
(repealed 1977).
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Read literally, the sentence required that the tort thresholds be met
and a civil action for general damages be commenced before the insurer
was entitled to any of the subrogation and indemnity rights available
to the insurer under section 65B.53, subdivisions 1 and 2 of the Act.
Such a requirement severely limited the insurers' rights to reimburse-
ment for benefits paid, because the tort thresholds are designed to elimi-
nate as much court litigation as possible, 7 and therefore a civil action
often would not be commenced.
The problems created by this limitation were immediately apparent.
The sentence may have denied a right of subrogation and allowed dou-
ble recovery, for example, in an out-of-state accident, if the accident was
a minor one, or if the insured settled with the at-fault third party with-
out instituting suit. The Minnesota insured already would have re-
covered basic economic loss benefits from insurance proceeds. Because
no civil action had been commenced where a settlement had been
reached or because the tort thresholds had not been met where the
accident was a minor one, the insurer would have no subrogation rights
and would not be entitled to the second round of benefits recovered by
its insured.
More severe in result was the effect of the sentence on the insurer's
right of indemnity.u With the right of indemnity contingent upon insti-
tution of a civil action, and with litigation discouraged, the insurer's
right of indemnity was extremely limited. Only where severe injury was
suffered would the insurer be assured of recovering any of the basic
economic loss benefits which it had paid. Settlement by an insured
without instituting a civil action raised the further possibility of cutting
off the insurer from whatever right of indemnity remained, because
settlement could occur where the tort thresholds had been met and
87. See R. KEE oN & J. O'CONNFLL, supra note 1, at 274-77. In discussing the rationale
behind the tort exemptions provided in their Basic Protection Plan, Keeton and O'Connell
write:
The tort exemption is also important because it serves to preclude litigation
over negligence in a great mass of cases of less severe injury. If the damages in
a claim based on negligence could not possibly exceed either $5,000 for pain and
suffering or $10,000 for other damages, it would be futile for the victim to assert
a claim based on negligence. His remedy would be entirely under basic protec-
tion coverage. On the other hand, if the victim could establish liability based
on negligence and damages in excess of either of these limits, his tort claim
would be available to him if he wished to assert it. The exemption drastically
reduces the number of cases in which the expense of litigation and preparation
for the prospect of litigation will be incurred, since the percentage of injuries so
severe as to escape applicability of the tort exemption is small. The effect on
both court congestion and the administrative overhead of an automobile claims
system will be distinctly beneficial.
Id. at 275.
88. See id.
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where the insurer thus would otherwise be granted the indemnity right.89
The 1977 amendments eliminated the interpretive problems arising
out of the sentence." That sentence was repealed, thereby removing any
explicit or implicit restriction on the rights of subrogation and indem-
nity afforded under section 65B.53 of the Act.' Today, the insurers'
rights are fairly straightforward. For accidents arising on or after Au-
gust 1, 1977, an insurer will possess a right of indemnity against the
insurer of any commercial vehicle whose driver was the at-fault party
in the accident. Such indemnity right will be subject to mandatory,
binding, good faith, interinsurer arbitration which will be available
without regard to actions taken or not taken by the insured.2 Subroga-
tion rights are granted an insurer only to the extent that there would
otherwise be double recovery by the insured involved in accidents aris-
ing out of the state93 and those rights can be exercised only if the in-
surer agrees to bear its proportionate share of attorney's fees and court
costs.9 4 Where the insured has a claim based on an intentional tort, on
89. The construction of the sentence has importance although it was repealed during
the 1977 legislative session. See note 91 infra and accompanying text. The sentence will
still have application in accidents occurring prior to the effective date of the amendments,
August 1, 1977. The fact that the sentence remained a part of section 65B.51(1) after
the 1976 amendments, appears to have been a legislative oversight. No reason existed to
afford a right of indemnity which is limited by requiring the institution of a civil action.
The concept is foreign to the development of the principle of indemnity, which has always
been an independent right and has not been derivative of another's right to bring suit.
Secondly, legislative intent militates against affording the sentence its apparent effect.
Reference to section 65B.51(1) is dropped from the out-of-state subrogation provision,
MINN. STAT. § 65B.53(2) (1976), under the 1976 amendment with the apparent purpose
being allowance of subrogation whenever the insured has an out-of-state tort claim. This
is the only logical construction of that provision since the concern here is to prevent double
recovery by the insured. One of the other purposes of the Act, elimination of court conges-
tion, is not applicable here. The court congestion of the other state probably is not a
concern of the Minnesota Legislature.
At most then, the last sentence of section 65B.51(1) applies to the right of indemnity
afforded an insurer in section 65B.53(1). Since any other reading is inconsistent with the
overall purposes of the Act, it is arguable that the sentence has been retained to make it
clear that the insurer has an independent right to indemnification under subdivision 1 of
section 65B.53 even where suit has been instituted by its insured against the third party.
This is a necessary interpretation because the 1976 legislature saw fit to repeal the subdivi-
sion affording a right of subrogation to the insurer in all instances where its insured was
allowed under the Act to bring a tort action against the third party. To repeal the express
provision allowing subrogation and then turn around and limit the insurer's right to
indemnification, in effect, to subrogation on an insured's claim would be wholly inconsis-
tent.
90. See notes 86-89 supra and accompanying text.
91. See Act of May 25, 1977, ch. 266, § 4, 1977 Minn. Laws 438 (amending MINN. STAT.
§ 65B.51(1)).
92. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.53(4) (1976); notes 103-18 infra and accompanying text.
93. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.53(2) (1976).
94. See notes 100-02 infra and accompanying text.
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negligence other than negligence arising out of the maintenance, use, or
operation of a motor vehicle, or a claim based on strict or non-no-fault
statutory liability, the insurer will also have a subrogation right to the
extent that double recovery might otherwise occur."
B. Enforcement of Subrogation and Indemnity Rights
The enforcement of subrogation and indemnity rights may present
special problems to an insurer. Generally, however, subrogation rights
will be enforced in concert with additional claims held by the insured
in a civil tort action and indemnity rights will be enforced through
arbitration proceedings. The problems created by .nforcement of either
of these rights are examined below.
1. Enforcement of Subrogation Rights
Subrogation rights held by an insurer under the Act generally will be
enforced in a civil action before the courts. 6 Whether the action is
brought in the name of the insurer or in the name of the insured will
depend on the real party in interest rules found in the Minnesota Rules
of Civil Procedure.97 Under the rules, if the insured retains some interest
in the cause of action against a third party for which an insurer has a
subrogation right, the suit against the third party may be brought in the
insured's name." However, where the insured's loss is fully covered by
the no-fault coverage, the insurer, in exercising its subrogation right, is
the real party in interest and must bring the suit against the third party
in its own name, not in the name of its insured."
An additional amendment to the Act in 1977 resolved the question of
which party, the insurer or the insured, was responsible for attorney's
fees where the insurer sought to exercise a right of subrogation. The Act
as originally adopted left the question unanswered. In 1977, the legisla-
ture added subdivision 8 to section 65B.53.101 Effective May 21, 1977,
that subdivision provides that a subrogation right held by an insurer
shall be enforceable only if the insurer, upon the request of its insured,
agrees to pay a share of the attorney's fees and costs incurred in the
action.'' The share agreed to must be in proportion to the insurer's
interest in the claim and any eventual recovery thereon.02
95. MINN. STAT. § 65B.53(3) (1976).
96. For a general discussion of the methods utilized by insurers to enforce subrogation
rights, see 16 G. CoucH, supra note 23, §§ 61:26-:35.
97. MINN. R. Civ. P. 17.01 (1977).
98. See Blair v. Espeland, 231 Minn. 444, 446, 43 N.W.2d 274, 276 (1950).
99. See id.
100. See Act of May 20, 1977, ch. 188, § 2, 1977 Minn. Laws 311 (to be codified as MINN.
STAT. § 65B.53(8)).
101. See id.
102. See id.
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2. Enforcement of Indemnity Rights
The right of indemnity is enforceable only through arbitration. The
responsibility for establishing an arbitration procedure through which
an insurer could exercise a right of indemnity under the Act fell to the
Minnesota Commissioner of Insurance. °3 Such rules and regulations
were proposed on July 25, 1977 and should be effective by the spring of
1978.101
Pursuant to subdivision 4 of Minnesota Statutes section 65B.53, the
Insurance Division of the Minnesota Department of Commerce estab-
lished an Arbitration Committee with jurisdiction over all compulsory
arbitration claims arising under the Act. 05 The committee, appointed
by the Committee on Insurance Arbitration, will be composed of repre-
sentatives of insurance companies doing business in the state.' Mem-
bers will be selected on the basis of experience and will serve without
compensation. 7 To prevent bias and any appearance of impropriety, no
member of the committee may serve as an arbitrator on a panel hearing
a case in which a direct interest is held by that member's insurance
company.'0"
Under the proposed rules, an insurer may commence an arbitration
proceeding by filing an "Arbitration Notice" with the Secretary of the
Arbitration Committee and by serving notice upon the insurer against
whom the indemnity claim is made.00 The proceeding itself is designed
to be relatively informal," although formal answers to claims may be
filed"' and the arbitration panel, selected from the Arbitration Commit-
tee members, may request briefs on the law involved."' Witnesses also
may be called upon to appear before the panel if the opposing insurance
company is so notified in advance of the arbitration hearing."' In addi-
tion, legal counsel, or other representative of the insurers, may appear
at the hearing."' All arbitration proceedings are subject to the rules of
comparative negligence." 5
103. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.53(4) (1976).
104. Before the proposed rules become finalized, the procedures for adoption of admin-
istrative rules, contained in MINN. STAT. §§ 15.0412-0417 (1976), must be satisfied. It is
anticipated that this will occur in early 1978.
105. See 4 M.C.A.R. § 1, Ins. 184 (proposed 1977).
106. See id. Ins. 182(i).
107. See id. Ins. 182(i)(1).
108. See id. Ins. 182(i)(2).
109. See id. Ins. 186(a).
110. See id. Ins. 187(f).
111. See id. Ins. 186(c)-(d).
112. See id. Ins. 187(g).
113. See id. Ins. 187(h).
114. Id. Ins. 187(i).
115. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.53(4) (1976).
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The arbitration panel's decision on issues of fact or law is final, and
binding,"' subject only to specific qualifications set forth in the rules.
A decision may be vacated upon motion to district court on the following
grounds: (1) the decision was procured by corruption, fraud, or other
undue means; (2) there was partiality or corruption on the part of the
arbitrators, or any one of them; (3) the arbitrators were guilty of miscon-
duct in refusing postponement, in refusing to hear evidence material to
the controversy, or in other matters whereby the rights of the party were
prejudiced; (4) the panel exceeded its powers, or executed them so im-
perfectly that a mutual, final, and definite decision was not made; or
(5) the decision is contrary to law and evidence." 7 The rules also provide
that modifications of decisions may be made by the district court upon
the basis of mistake or defects in the form of the award which do not
affect the merits of the decision and where such defect could have been
disregarded by the panel in reaching its conclusion." 8
This use of arbitration is seen as an efficient, quick, and relatively
inexpensive method of adjudicating indemnity claims. It removes such
claims from an already overcrowded court system and the vagaries of a
fair but probably unqualified jury. The setting instead is one where the
participants are professionals in the field and fault can be determined
strictly on the merits. Under such a system there need be no concern
that a severely injured party will go uncompensated, for compensation
has already taken place. Neither should there be any fear that a slightly
injured party will be overcompensated. The dispute is between two
insurance companies in an arbitration proceeding which is charged with
the task of determining which insurer should bear a loss already fixed
in amount.
Thus, a no-fault system retaining indemnity rights subject to arbitra-
tion is consistent with the principle of preserving responsibility for negli-
gent driving conduct. Arbitration, therefore, can correct the major prob-
lems of the fault-based compensation system, without major interfer-
ence with the present insurance rating system which bases premium
charges upon the injury-causing capacity of the driver. The Minnesota
Act achieves this by submitting indemnity claims to the arbitration
process; the limited subrogation right granted the insurer need not be
placed before the arbitration panel because the court action generally
will take place in another state when the accident has arisen out of the
state.
C. Remaining Problems
At least three questions remain unanswered concerning the subroga-
116. See 4 M.C.A.R. § 1, Ins. 188(b) (proposed 1977).
117. See id. Ins. 188(b)(1).
118. See id. Ins. 188(b)(2).
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tion and indemnity rights of insurers under the Minnesota Act. The Act
does not speak to the question of the insurer's remedies when its insured
settles with an at-fault third party without instituting a court suit, in
derogation of the insurer's subrogation rights."' Secondly, the Act does
not provide the insurer with a subrogation right against the uninsured
motorist to recover basic economic loss benefits which it has paid to its
insured. 20 Finally, although the Act provides that workers' compensa-
tion benefits paid are to be subtracted from basic economic loss benefits
payable to an insured, no suggestion is made as to what remedies the
workers' compensation insurer might have against the insurer of the at-
fault third party.'
2 '
1. The Settlement Problem
The Minnesota Act makes no mention of the insurer's subrogation
rights in the event that its insured settles with the third party without
instituting a civil action. Is the insurer entitled to a portion of the
settlement as compensation for the basic economic loss benefits which
it has paid its insured? The answer to this question has ramifications
on the insurers' subrogation rights in accidents occurring prior to March
25, 1976, when full subrogation rights were granted the insurer in all
accidents occurring in Minnesota. 2 The answer also has ramifications
on the insurers' rights in claims based on an intentional tort, based on
negligence other than negligence arising out of the maintenance, use, or
operation of a motor vehicle, or claims based on strict or non-no-fault
statutory liability.ln
119. See notes 122-27 infra and accompanying text.
120. See notes 128-47 infra and accompanying text.
121. See notes 148-62 infra and accompanying text.
122. Prior to March 25, 1976, section 65B.53(2) granted full subrogation rights to the
insurer in all accidents occurring in Minnesota. Compare Minnesota No-Fault Automobile
Insurance Act, ch. 408, § 13, 1974 Minn. Laws 776 (amended 1976 and 1977) with Act of
Mar. 25, 1976, ch. 79, § 1, 1976 Minn. Laws 201 (amended 1977). The subrogation rights
of the insurer may not be protected under the present Act, as illustrated in the following
hypothetical. An insured settles out of court for $45,000 for injuries arising out of an
accident which occurred in December of 1975. No court suit was instituted. The insurer
has paid its insured $30,000 in basic economic loss benefits and now seeks to recover that
sum from the settlement which its insured has received. Because the insured has already
been compensated for injuries suffered in the accident, it is plausible that the settlement
amount reflects only general damages suffered by the insured.
123. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.53(3) (1976). Double recovery may occur, for example,
under the Civil Damage Act. See MINN. STAT. § 340.95 (1976), as amended by Act of June
2, 1977, ch. 390, § 1, 1977 Minn. Laws 887. For example, an individual involved in an
automobile accident with an intoxicated driver may have a claim against a third party
who supplied the intoxicated driver with the liquor. Under the provisions of the Minnesota
No-Fault Act, the insurer has a subrogation right to any recovery under the Civil Damage
Act, see MINN. STAT. § 65B.53(3) (1976), which would result in double recovery by its
insured. If settlement is reached without actual court litigation, the insurer may be denied
recovery of the basic economic loss benefits which it would otherwise be entitled to receive.
[Vol. 4
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If settlement of any of the above claims is reached without actual
court litigation, the insurer, under the present Minnesota Act, may be
denied recovery of the basic economic loss benefits which it would other-
wise be entitled to receive.'24 Moreover, the insured could recover twice
for the basic economic loss benefits mandated under the Act.
This issue presents a basic public policy conflict. Should the insured
be allowed to deny the insurer its subrogation right by settling with the
third party without protecting the insurer's rights? On the other hand,
where the insurer has failed to protect its rights by reaching an agree-
ment with the insured prior to settlement, should that insurer be al-
lowed to recover part of a settlement which may well have been recovery
for noneconomic detriment only, and therefore does not constitute dou-
ble recovery by the insured?
The solution to this dilemma is not a simple one. The insurer may not
include in the insurance contract any provision which would permit the
insurer to determine when or whether a civil action will be commenced
by the insured.' Clearly, this provision indicates a legislative concern
that the insured should retain control of all litigation arising out of the
accident. Furthermore, because the subrogation right is only granted the
insurer to prevent double recovery by the insured,' the insurer should
124. See Great N. Oil Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 291 Minn. 97, 99-100,
189 N.W.2d 404, 406-07 (1971) (subrogation rights of insurer may be defeated by insured
settling with wrongdoer). A Hennepin County District Court has recently concurred in the
conclusion that the insurer will have no recourse against an insured or a third party when
settlement is reached between that insured and the third party. In Assink v. Allstate Ins.
Co., No. 739797 (Minn. 4th Dist. Ct., filed Dec. 15, 1977), the insurer asserted that the
insured's settlement and release of General Motors from a claim arising out of an automo-
bile accident prejudiced its right to be subrogated to the insured's claim against General
Motors. The court rejected the assertion stating:
It is clear to this Court however that this argument ignores the clearly artic-
ulated provision embodied in the Minnesota No-Fault Act which essentially
states that a right of subrogation does not arise until "a civil action has been
commenced in the manner prescribed in applicable laws or rules of civil proce-
dure to recover damages for non-economic detriment." MSA 65B.1, subd. 1.
It is true that there may be lingering problems associated with the time and
circumstances under which a reparations obligor's right to subrogation arises.
However, there is no showing in this case that plaintiff is being doubly compen-
sated by virtue of a prior settlement with General Motors.
Accordingly, this Court must conclude that plaintiffs settlement against
General Motors has not prejudiced the right of subrogation of Allstate since such
a subrogation right never existed.
125. MINN. STAT. § 65B.53(6) (1976) reads:
No reparation obligor shall include in its contract any provision which would
require a person to commence a negligence action as a condition precedent to
the payment of basic economic loss benefits or which permits the reparation
obligor to determine whether such an action will be commenced. No reparation
obligor shall contract for a right of reimbursement or subrogation greater than
or in addition to those permitted by this chapter.
126. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.53(2)-(3) (1976).
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not be able to force litigation of a claim which the insured does not
desire to pursue.
So long as subrogation rights are afforded, however, an insured should
not be permitted to evade the effect of such rights by reaching a settle-
ment with the at-fault third party. The best solution would be another
amendment to the subrogation provisions to clarify the rights of the
insurer where settlement is reached without recourse to the courts. Such
an amendment probably should require the insured to notify the insurer
of the proposed settlement so the insurer might protect its rights to basic
economic loss benefits. This requirement would allow the insurer to
notify the at-fault third party's insurer of its interest in any settle-
ment.7 The third party's insurer then could be held accountable for its
failure to take the rights of the injured party's insurer into considera-
tion. If the insurer should fail to act upon such notice from its insured,
the insured should not be required to reimburse the insurer out of the
settlement proceeds.
In absence of an amendment, the responsibility for resolving this
dilemma will reside with the courts. This result is unfortunate because
the purpose of no-fault is to avoid court litigation wherever possible.
Without a clarification, however, insurers and insureds are likely to find
themselves pitted against one another in court in a dispute over which
party is rightfully entitled to all or part of the proceeds of a settlement.
Should this happen, unfortunate as it may be, the best approach by the
courts would be an equitable one, deciding each case separately. The
determination then could be based on the intent of the parties as to what
the settlement was for and whether the insurer had an opportunity to
protect its rights prior to the settlement.
2. Subrogation and Indemnity Rights Against the Underinsured and
the Uninsured Motorist
Under the Minnesota Act, insurers must offer underinsured motorist
127. Upon receiving notice of the insured's negotiations with the at-fault third party,
the insurer, under Minnesota law will be able to protect its interests by notifying the third
party of its subrogation right. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Vaccari, __ Minn. -, 245
N.W.2d 844 (1976). In Travelers, the Minnesota Supreme Court granted an insurer the
right to enforce its subrogation claim against the third party despite a general release
granted the third party by the insured. The insurer had made medical payments to its
insured and was entitled to subrogation rights to the insured's claim against the third
party. Notice of these rights was given to the third party who ignored the notice and
entered into a settlement agreement with the insured. The issue considered by the court
was whether the general release executed by the insured extinguished Travelers' subroga-
tion claim. The court concluded that the release did not extinguish the insurer's rights
when "settlement is procured by a tortfeasor ... after notice of the insurer's subrogation
claim." Id. at __, 245 N.W.2d at 847 (emphasis by the court).
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coverage to all of their insureds.121 The underinsured motorist coverage
compensates an insured for losses suffered in excess of those compen-
sated either by the basic economic loss benefits or by the residual liabil-
ity coverage of the at-fault third party.'2 The insurer, after paying for
those excess losses, is entitled to exercise a right of subrogation to its
insured's claims against the at-fault third party, to the extent of excess
benefits paid. 13
Insurance against losses caused by the driver of an uninsured motor
vehicle is mandatory under the Act.13 ' The minimum coverage required
includes $50,000 in bodily injury coverage for any accident and $25,000
bodily injury coverage for any individual involved in an accident with
an uninsured motor vehicle.3 2 An insured may not recover under the
uninsured motor vehicle coverage for benefits already compensated by
the basic economic loss benefits paid by the insurer.1
3
The penalty provisions of the Act subject an uninsured motorist to full
tort liability,13' thus the tort threshold is inapplicable. Consequently, an
insured who is injured in an accident involving an uninsured motorist
will be entitled to recover from the uninsured party all losses arising out
of the accident, without a deduction for the basic economic loss benefits
received from the insurer.
The uninsured motorist coverage will provide additional compensa-
tion for losses in excess of those compensated for by the basic economic
loss benefits.'" Generally, the additional losses will arise where injuries
are suffered which exceed the $30,000 basic economic loss benefits pro-
vided by the Act 3 ' and where the insured suffers general damages which
are not compensated by no-fault insurance.
Unlike the underinsured motorist provision, the Minnesota Act is
silent regarding the subrogation and indemnity rights of an insurer
against an uninsured motorist who is the at-fault party in an automobile
128. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.49(6)(e) (1976), as amended by Act of May 25, 1977, ch.
266, § 3, 1977 Minn. Laws 438, as amended by Act of May 26, 1977, ch. 276, § 3, 1977
Minn. Laws 476.
129. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.49(6)(e) (1976), as amended by Act of May 25, 1977, ch.
266, § 3, 1977 Minn. Laws 438, as amended by Act of May 26, 1977, ch. 276, § 3, 1977
Minn. Laws 476.
130. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.49(6)(e) (1976), as amended by Act of May 25, 1977, ch.
266, § 3, 1977 Minn. Laws 438, as amended by Act of May 26, 1977, ch. 276, § 3, 1977
Minn. Laws 476.
131. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.49, subd. 4(1) (1976), as amended by Act of May 25, 1977,
ch. 266, § 2, 1977 Minn. Laws 437.
132. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.49, subd. 4(1) (1976), as amended by Act of May 25, 1977,
ch. 266, § 2, 1977 Minn. Laws 437.
133. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.49, subd. 4(4) (1976).
134. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.67(1) (1976).
135. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.49(4) (1976), as amended by Act of May 25, 1977, ch. 266,
§ 2, 1977 Minn. Laws 437.
136. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.44(1) (1976).
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accident. If no such rights can be found either in common law or implic-
itly in the Act itself, then double recovery by the insured for losses
arising out of the accident is likely to occur."'
The insurer apparently will possess full pre-no-fault subrogation and
indemnity rights for benefits paid out under uninsured motor vehicle
coverage. Uninsured motor vehicle coverage was required prior to the
adoption of the Minnesota Act and insurers clearly possessed subroga-
tion and indemnity rights under the prior law.' Therefore, because the
preexisting uninsured motorist statute merely was incorporated into the
Act, the insurers' subrogation and indemnity rights under the preexist-
ing statute apparently remain intact.
The conclusion that the insurer may exercise common law subroga-
tion and indemnity rights is supported by the penalty provisions of the
Act. As mentioned earlier, the Act permits a person injured by an unin-
sured motorist to exercise full common law tort rights against the motor-
ist. 3 Consequently, it can be argued that the insurer also retains its full
common law subrogation and indemnity rights against the uninsured
motorist and hence does not need statutory authorization to exercise
those rights. 4 '
137. The penalty provisions of the Act subject the uninsured third party to full tort
liability. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.67(1) (1976). The insured will thus be entitled to recover
for losses which have already been compensated by basic economic loss benefits because
the deduction provisions of section 65B.51(1) will not apply. If the insurer must comply
with the specific subrogation rights granted in the Act, it will not be able to recover those
amounts which constitute double recovery of basic economic loss benefits.
138. Although uninsured motorist insurance was mandatory prior to the adoption of no-
fault insurance in the state, see Act of May 23, 1969, ch. 630, 1969 Minn. Laws 1087
(amending MINN. STAT. § 72A.149 (1967), current version at MINN. STAT. § 65B.49(4)
(1976), as amended by Act of May 25, 1977, ch. 266, § 2, 1977 Minn. Laws 437), that
requirement did not alter the common law tort liability of the uninsured, at-fault third
party. The uninsured third party was subject to full tort liability just as the insured, at-
fault third party was subject to full tort liability. See Kirouac v. Healey, 104 N.H. 157,
160, 181 A.2d 634, 636 (1962), where the court observed:
Nor is [uninsured motorist insurance] a contract to indemnify the third-party
uninsured motorist against liability, for the contract is not for the latter's bene-
fit. His legal liability will be unaffected by any payment made by the insurer,
who will then be subrogated to the plaintiff's rights against the uninsured mo-
torist.
139. See note 134 supra and accompanying text.
140. Also supportive of this conclusion is the express subrogation right which the legis-
lature granted an insurer offering underinsured motorist coverage to its insured. See MINN.
STAT. § 65B.49(6)(e) (1976), as amended by Act of May 25, 1977, ch. 266, § 3, 1977 Minn.
Laws 438, as amended by Act of May 26, 1977, ch. 276, § 3, 1977 Minn. Laws 476. The
Act clearly provides that an insurer may not contract with its insured for any rights of
subrogation or indemnity which are not otherwise provided by the Act. See MINN. STAT.
§ 65B.53(6) (1976). Therefore, for the insurer to recover benefits paid under the underin-
sured motorist coverage, and thus prevent double recovery by the insured, a right of
subrogation must be granted statutorily. In contrast, the uninsured motorist, under the
penalty provisions of the Act, is subject to full common law tort liability. See MINN. STAT.
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Although a common law right of subrogation may be implied as to
benefits paid under the uninsured motorist coverage, the result may well
be different with regard to the basic economic loss benefits paid by the
insurer for injuries caused by an uninsured motorist. The duty to pay
basic economic loss benefits is primary and arises solely out of the Min-
nesota Act;' no pre-Act basis for such duty existed. Therefore, no com-
mon law subrogation or indemnity rights are available with respect to
basic economic loss benefits to the insurer and none are permitted by
the Act.' Additionally, the general subrogation and indemnity provi-
sions of the Minnesota Act will be of little or no value to the insurer who
is dealing with an uninsured motorist. The indemnity right is available
only against the insurer of the third party 3 and, by definition, no such
insurer exists in an accident caused by the negligence of an uninsured
motorist. " Furthermore, the general subrogation provision will be
available only when the accident with the uninsured motorist occurs out
of the state.
4 5
The possibility therefore exists that the insured will exercise full com-
mon law tort rights against the uninsured motorist, recovering a second
time for the injuries and losses which already have been compensated
by the basic economic loss benefits paid by the insurer. Such a result is
clearly not intended by the Act, because a major purpose of the no-fault
scheme is to prevent the double recovery that will occur in this situa-
tion. 45 Unfortunately, without a legislative clarification of the insurer's
rights, no subrogation or indemnity rights for basic economic loss bene-
fits can be granted without violating the express provisions of the Act."1
7
§ 65B.67(1) (1976). The insurer therefore may exercise subrogation and indemnity rights
permitted under the common law.
141. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.61(1) (1976), which provides:
Basic economic loss benefits shall be primary with respect to benefits, except
for those paid or payable under a workers compensation law, which any person
receives or is entitled to receive from any source as a result of injury arising out
of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle.
142. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.53(6) (1976), which in effect limits the insurer's remedies
against an at-fault third party to those rights specifically enumerated in the Act by
prohibiting the insurer from contracting with its insured for any right of subrogation or
indemnity which is not granted under the Act.
143. See notes 79-85 supra and accompanying text.
144. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.49, subd. 4(3) (1976), as amended by Act of May 25, 1977,
ch. 266, § 2, 1977 Minn. Laws 437.
145. See notes 71-78 supra and accompanying text.
146. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.42(5) (1976).
147. Although permitting the insurer a subrogation right would violate the express
provisions of the Act, the argument might be made that not to do so would so seriously
violate the intent of the Act to prevent double recovery by the insured that the courts
should grant the insurer a subrogation right to any claim by its insured for basic economic
loss benefits. The courts have long recognized their power to read unclear statutes in a
manner which accomplishes the intent of the legislature. See, e.g., State ex rel. Patterson
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The problem of double recovery in accidents involving an uninsured
motorist therefore will not be solved until the legislature amends the Act
to grant the insurer a subrogation right against uninsured motorists to
the extent of basic economic loss benefits paid.
3. Subrogation Rights of the Workers' Compensation Insurer Against
the No-Fault Compensation Insurer
A difficult interpretive problem arises in situations where a workers'
compensation insurer attempts to exercise subrogation rights against a
no-fault insurer.4 8 An example will serve to illustrate the problem. An
employee is injured in an automobile accident during the course of his
employment. The injuries are such that the tort threshold limitations
of the No-Fault Act are satisfied. "9 The workers' compensation insurer
pays benefits to the employee. Those benefits, for the purposes of this
example, are the same as basic economic loss benefits under the No-
Fault Act. The workers' compensation insurer then seeks to invoke its
subrogation rights against the third party who caused the accident or
against that third party's no-fault insurer. The workers' compensation
insurer relies upon the subrogation provision of the workers' compensa-
tion law, which grants full subrogation rights when the party responsible
for the injury is someone other than the employer.' The at-fault party's
no-fault insurer objects because the Minnesota No-Fault Act does not
grant the workers' compensation insurer any such subrogation rights."'
Thus, the two laws appear to be in conflict and, absent a legislative
clarification, the courts must resolve the conflict through statutory con-
struction.
v. Bates, 96 Minn. 110, 104 N.W. 709 (1905). Under this power, the court could therefore
determine that a subrogation right arises implicitly under the Act where the insured might
recover twice for the same loss because the at-fault third party is uninsured and therefore
not entitled to the tort exemption provided under the terms of the Act.
148. The interpretive problems in this area generally do not apply to indemnity, since
the workers' compensation law does not permit an indemnity right. See American Mut.
Liab. Ins. Co. v. Reed Cleaners, 265 Minn. 503, 508-09, 122 N.W.2d 178, 182 (1963). But
see MINN. STAT. § 176.061(7) (1976) (employer has an independent right to recover from
at-fault third party for medical payments made by the employer for an employee's inju-
ries).
149. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.51(3) (1976). The significance of this fact is that if the tort
threshold limitations are satisfied, the injured party has a tort right against the at-fault
party. Without such a tort right, the employer or workers' compensation insurer would
have no right to which they could be subrogated. See notes 23-27 supra and accompany-
ing text.
150. See MINN. STAT. § 176.061(5) (1976).
151. The No-Fault Act grants subrogation and indemnity rights only to "reparation
obligors," which by definition are insurers obligated to provide the benefits specified in
the Act. See id. § 65B.43(9). Consequently, only insurers of motor vehicles, which of course
would not include workers' compensation insurers, are "reparation obligors" under the
Act.
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The proper resolution of the above problem is not clear. Ideally, both
the workers' compensation system and the no-fault system are closed
systems; each bears its own losses. However, in both systems the legisla-
ture has decided to shift some losses outside of each system.1 5 Unfor-
tunately, neither law addresses the problem of which system should
bear the loss when the subrogation rights under the workers' compen-
sation law conflict with the provisions of the No-Fault Act. It appears,
though, that the apparent intent of the legislature was to require the
workers' compensation system to bear the losses when the problem
raised above occurs.
Under the No-Fault Act, the legislature specifically provided that
where workers' compensation insurance covers an injury arising out of
an automobile accident, that insurance is utilized before any no-fault
insurance is payable.'53 Consequently, the legislature indicated that
where both workers' compensation benefits and no-fault benefits are
available for the same basic economic loss, the workers' compensation
insurer must compensate the injured party for the loss.'54 It would seem
to follow from this that the workers' compensation insurer, after paying
those losses, cannot seek reimbursement from the at-fault party's no-
fault insurer. To hold otherwise would shift the losses back to the no-
fault system, which would be contrary to the apparent intent of the
legislature that the workers' compensation system bear such losses. 5 5 In
addition, under the No-Fault Act, the injured party generally has no
right to collect basic economic losses from the at-fault party in a com-
mon law tort action 5 ' and therefore the workers' compensation insurer
152. The No-Fault Act shifts losses by granting an indemnity right against the insurer
of the commercial vehicle only when the driver of that vehicle is at fault. See id. §
65B.53(1), as amended by Act of May 25, 1977, ch. 266, § 5, 1977 Minn. Laws 439. The
Act also shifts losses outside the no-fault system to the extent that workers' compensation
benefits are payable prior to no-fault basic economic loss benefits. See MINN. STAT. §
65B.61(1)-(2) (1976). The workers' compensation law, on the other hand, attempts to shift
all losses caused by third parties outside of the workers' compensation system by granting
both the employer and the workers' compensation insurer full tort rights against the at-
fault third party. See id. § 176.061(5), (7).
153. See id. § 65B.61(1)-(2).
154. See id.
155. The fact that basic economic loss payments are the primary obligation of the
workers' compensation insurer also suggests that such an insurer should not be permitted
to recover from the at-fault party or that party's no-fault insurer, since the compensation
insurer is not compensating the injured employee for an injury which is the primary
responsibility of the no-fault insurer. This argument clearly would preclude an indemnity
right against the at-fault party or that party's no-fault insurer, see notes 19-22 supra and
accompanying text, and could provide analogous support for precluding a subrogation
right as well.
156. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.51(1) (1976), as amended by Act of May 25, 1977, ch. 266,
§ 4, 1977 Minn. Laws 438. An argument can be made that the injured employee can collect
for basic economic losses against the third party in cases where the employer or workers'
compensation insurer has compensated the employee for those losses. This argument is
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that pays the injured party for those basic economic losses also should
not be able to recover them. This is so because the insurer can have no
greater rights by subrogation than would its insured,'57 the party to
whose rights the insurer is subrogated. Consequently, the proper answer
to the problem seems to be that the workers' compensation insurer is
precluded from exercising its subrogation rights, despite the general
subrogation provisions of the workers' compensation law.5 8
based on the rationale that although the workers' compensation payments are in lieu of
basic economic loss benefits under section 65B.61(1), those payments technically are not
basic economic loss benefits but rather are workers' compensation benefits. If the pay-
ments are not considered to be basic economic loss benefits, then the injured employee
could collect such payments from the at-fault party in a tort action. See MINN. STAT. §
65B.51(1) (1976), as amended by Act of May 25, 1977, ch. 266, § 4, 1977 Minn. Laws 438.
If this argument is accepted, the employer or workers' compensation insurer should be
permitted a subrogation right to the employee's claim against the at-fault party, for the
same reasons outlined in the text accompanying notes 159-62 infra. This argument has
appeal, but it seems more realistic to interpret the payments made by the workers' com-
pensation insurer under section 65B.61(1) as being basic economic loss benefits. Basic
economic loss payments are defined in the No-Fault Act in relation to the type of loss
suffered, not in relation to the type of insurer that makes the payment. See MINN. STAT.
§§ 65B.43(10), .44 (1976), as amended by Act of May 25, 1977, ch. 266, § 1, 1977 Minn.
Laws 437. Consequently, if a workers' compensation insurer compensates the injured party
for basic economic loss, those payments should be considered basic economic loss benefits
which the insured cannot recover under section 65B.51(l) in a tort action against the at-
fault party.
157. See notes 23-27 supra and accompanying text.
158. The above interpretation potentially could create problems for the injured em-
ployee. The employer or its workers' compensation insurer could assert that they retain a
subrogation right against the at-fault party for any claim the employee has for general
damages or noneconomic loss, even though the payments made by the employer or work-
ers' compensation insurer are for basic economic loss. If the employer or workers' compen-
sation insurer succeeded in such an argument, the employee's potential recovery could be
significantly reduced. This could happen because the employer's subrogation rights would
permit the employer to be reimbursed from the employee's general damages recovery, thus
reducing the total amount recovered by the injured employee.
Whether the employer or its workers' compensation insurer could succeed in such an
argument is unclear. The No-Fault Act is unique in that it precludes an injured party from
collecting from the at-fault party in a tort action any basic economic loss benefits paid or
payable under the Act. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.51(1) (1976), as amended by Act of May
25, 1977, ch. 266, § 4, 1977 Minn. Laws 438. If the workers' compensation insurer reim-
burses the employee for basic economic losses yet is subrogated to the employee's claim
against the at-fault party for general damages (nonbasic economic loss), then the insurer
would be reimbursed from a fund of money designed to compensate the employee for losses
different from those compensated by the workers' compensation insurer. This would seem
to violate the basic subrogation principle that one only can be subrogated to another's
claim for the same losses as were paid to the injured party by the party seeking subroga-
tion. See, e.g., 16 G. CoucH, supra note 23, § 61:4. This principle suggests that when the
workers' compensation insurer compensates the employee for basic economic losses, the
insurer has no subrogation right because the insured has no tort right against the at-fault
party for such losses. This issue has not been faced by the Minnesota Supreme Court, but
the New York courts have considered the issue and have consistently held that the work-
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The solution suggested above is not necessarily absolute. The example
used to depict the problem contains a critical assumption which, if
altered, could change the suggested solution. That assumption is that
the workers' compensation benefits paid are the same as basic economic
loss benefits under the No-Fault Act. If, however, the workers' compen-
sation insurer pays for losses different from no-fault basic economic loss
benefits, or pays an amount in excess of required basic economic loss
benefits under the No-Fault Act, then a strong argument can be made
that the workers' compensation insurer has a subrogation right for such
different or excess payments against the at-fault party and the no-fault
insurer. Under the No-Fault Act, the injured party cannot collect, in a
common law tort action, basic economic loss benefits received, even if
ers' compensation insurer has no subrogation right against the injured employee's claim
for nonbasic economic loss against the at-fault party when the compensation insurer's
payments to the employee were for basic economic loss. See Grello v. Daszykowski, -
App. Div. 2d -, 397 N.Y.S.2d 396 (1977) (two judges dissent; both majority and dis-
sents agree that the legislature should clarify the issue); Granger v. Urda, 54 App. Div.
2d 377, 388 N.Y.S.2d 936 (1976) (two dissents); Scott v. Orange County Dep't of Health,
89 Misc. 2d 853, 393 N.Y.S.2d 156 (Sup. Ct. 1977). In addition, Minnesota cases interpret-
ing the subrogation provision of the workers' compensation law indicate the Minnesota
court would adopt the position taken by the New York courts and this Note. See Kowalske
v. Armour & Co., 300 Minn. 301, 310, 220 N.W.2d 268, 274 (1974) (employer who makes
medical payments for employee's injuries is subrogated to employee's claim against at-
fault party only if employee's claim includes a claim for the medical payments); Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nutting Truck & Caster Co., 295 Minn. 211, 216, 203 N.W.2d 542, 545
(1973) (employee can settle with at-fault party for a claim for losses other than those
compensated by workers' compensation insurer and the insurer cannot share in the settle-
ment); Williams v. Holm, 288 Minn. 371, 181 N.W.2d 107 (1970) (purpose of workers'
compensation subrogation provision is to eliminate double recovery by the injured em-
ployee); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Reed Cleaners, 265 Minn. 503, 509-10, 122
N.W.2d 178, 182-83 (1963) (employer has no greater rights in subrogation than does the
employee against the at-fault party; employer can only assert employee's claim; workers'
compensation subrogation provision is no broader than common law subrogation); Enghu-
sen v. H. Christiansen & Sons, Inc., 259 Minn. 442, 448, 107 N.W.2d 843, 848 (1961)
(subrogation provision is to be interpreted strictly against the employer and in favor of
the employee); cf. Brunmeier v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 296 Minn. 328, 334, 208 N.W.2d 860,
864 (1973) (court implies that workers' compensation subrogation provision should not be
interpreted in a manner which would place the injured party in a worse position than if
not covered by workers' compensation).
An argument also can be made that allowing the compensation insurer to recover its
basic economic loss payments from the injured employee's recovery from the at-fault party
for nonbasic economic loss would be unconstitutional. A Michigan appellate court recently
so held, under an analogous statute, reasoning that allowing the insurer such a subrogation
right would violate equal protection. See Murray v. Ferris, - Mich. App. - , 253
N.W.2d 365 (1977). The court reasoned that a common law tort right is designed to make
the injured party whole, which would not occur if the insurer was allowed a subrogation
right against the injured party's recovery for nonbasic economic loss. The court held that
such a subrogation right therefore would discriminate among accident victims; some
receive full recovery for their injuries since they suffer only economic loss, while others
are not fully compensated for their injuries because of the subrogation provision.
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the tort threshold has been satisfied.'59 Under the Act, the workers'
compensation insurer has the primary responsibility to pay those bene-
fits.16 0 However, if the workers' compensation insurer pays the injured
party for losses different from, or in excess of, basic economic loss bene-
fits required by the No-Fault Act, then the workers' compensation in-
surer is not paying benefits which are its primary obligation under the
No-Fault Act. In addition, the injured party can collect such losses in a
common law tort action, assuming the tort threshold has been satisfied.
Consequently, if the injured party can collect for such losses, and the
workers' compensation insurer has paid the injured party for those
losses, there appears to be no valid reason under the No-Fault Act why
the workers' compensation insurer should be forbidden from exercising
its subrogation rights against the at-fault party or that party's no-fault
insurer.' If the workers' compensation insurer were not permitted to
exercise its subrogation rights in such a case, the injured party could
receive a double recovery, once from the workers' compensation system
and once from the no-fault system. This would be inconsistent with both
the subrogation provisions of the workers' compensation law and the
intent of the No-Fault Act. 62 Because nothing in the No-Fault Act spe-
cifically mandates such a result, the Act should not be interpreted to
reach that result.
The resolution of the problems created when the no-fault system and
the workers' compensation system collide thus depends upon whether
the payments made by the workers' compensation insurer are the equiv-
alent of basic economic loss benefits under the No-Fault Act. To the
extent that they are, the workers' compensation insurer should have no
subrogation rights against the at-fault party or the no-fault insurer; to
the extent that they are not equivalent to basic economic loss benefits,
the workers' compensation insurer should be permitted to exercise such
subrogation rights.
V. SUBROGATION AND INDEMNITY IN THE NO-FAULT SETTING-Is THE
INCLUSION A WISE ONE?
In its short history, the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance
Act has undergone major revisions with respect to its subrogation and
indemnity provisions. The changes have revealed a movement toward a
pure no-fault system of insurance and a reversal in the attitude of the
legislature toward the retention of "fault" within the no-fault system.
159. See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
160. See note 153 supra and accompanying text.
161. See UMVARA § 6, Comment.
162. Compare Wandersee v. Brellenthin Chevrolet Co., 258 Minn. 19, 23, 102 N.W.2d
514, 517 (1960) (subrogation provision of workers' compensation law designed to avoid
double recovery) with MINN. STAT. § 65B.53(2)-(3) (1976) (No-Fault Act subrogation pro-
visions are to be invoked only to avoid double recovery).
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The Minnesota Act, it should be remembered, was enacted originally
as a compromise of the two houses of the legislature.' The original
subrogation and indemnity provisions were exceedingly broad and al-
lowed insurers to shift virtually all losses arising out of automobile acci-
dents to the at-fault party, despite the Act's "no-fault" label."4 The
concession of some legislators to adopt the "no-fault" system did not
apparently extend as far as to eliminate the fault determination from
the system. Confusion over the distinction, if any, between the subroga-
tion and indemnity rights of the insurers led the legislature to amend
the Act in 1976.165 The insurers were limited to exercising subrogation
rights to their insured's claims based on intentional torts, on strict or
non-no-fault statutory liability, or on negligence other than negligence
arising out of the maintenance, use, or operation of a motor vehicle. The
fault determination was therefore eliminated from a portion of the com-
pensation system in Minnesota.'66
In 1977, the indemnity provision was altered to allow indemnity only
against the insurer of a commercial vehicle where the driver of that
commercial vehicle was the at-fault party in the accident. 7 This change
moves the Minnesota Act closely in line with the proposals set forth in
the Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act,' discussed
below.6 9 Under the present provisions, losses will be reallocated to the
at-fault party only on a highly selective basis, and generally, only in
instances where the losses may be passed on to the motoring industry
and not borne solely by the unfortunate victims of the motor vehicle
accident.
As has been seen, Minnesota has made a policy decision to include
limited subrogation and indemnity rights within its statutory no-fault
scheme. Although Minnesota and a majority of states with no-fault
163. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
164. See notes 72-74, 79-82 supra and accompanying text.
165. See notes 75-78 supra and accompanying text.
166. See notes 75-78 supra and accompanying text.
167. See notes 84-85 supra and accompanying text.
168. The Minnesota Act will achieve much the same reallocation of costs under the
indemnity provision as does UMVARA under its reallocation provisions. Experience of the
insurance industry has shown that over 90% of the damage and injuries suffered in motor
vehicle accidents are caused by heavy commercial vehicles. See UMVARA § 38, Com-
ment. UMVARA in its reallocation provisions recognizesthis expressly. Reallocation of
losses to the insurer of the commercial vehicle is provided under UMVARA's rating classi-
fication. Id. The Minnesota Act achieves the same basic result by allowing reallocation
of losses only when the driver of a commercial vehicle is the at-fault party in the motor
vehicle accident. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.53(1) (1976), as amended by Act of May 25, 1977,
ch. 266, § 5, 1977 Minn. Laws 439. The definition of "commercial vehicle" in the Act is
based generally on the weight of the vehicle. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.42(12) (1976). There-
fore, although based on fault, reallocation generally will be only to the insurers of the same
vehicles to which UMVARA's reallocation provisions will shift losses.
169. See notes 205-22 infra and accompanying text.
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schemes have retained subrogation and indemnity rights in one form or
another, 170 the 1976 and 1977 amendments by the Minnesota Legislature
evince a trend toward a pure no-fault plan.'71 The question may then be
properly raised, should rights of subrogation and indemnity be retained
in a no-fault system?
A. The Proponents' Side
Proponents give two main reasons for the inclusion of subrogation and
indemnity rights in modified no-fault plans such as in Minnesota: de-
terrence" and reallocation of losses.' Rates under a fault-based system
are based on the injury-causing capacity of the driver, as opposed to the
injury-causing capacity of the vehicle. 174 Age, sex, occupation, and
health are only a few of the characteristics which are utilized in deter-
mining the insurance rates charged an individual in a fault-based sys-
tem.7 5 Because rates are determined by the likelihood of an individual
to be involved in an accident and because rates suffer a concomitant
increase when a driver is actually involved in an accident, the propo-
nents argue that the driver will therefore be more careful to avoid fur-
ther rate increases.
176
Secondly, proponents find it imperative that reallocation of losses
among insurers be allowed. Under a no-fault plan, benefits must be paid
to the insured as loss accrues. 17 7 Such a system, say the proponents, pays
out substantially greater sums of money to insureds, because virtually
all of at least the initial losses arising out of the accident are compen-
sated by some form of insurance. 7 1 If reallocation of losses is not pro-
170. See notes 50-60 supra and accompanying text.
171. Over the short span of the No-Fault Act's existence, the legislature has narrowed
the scope of the subrogation and indemnity rights of the no-fault insurer significantly. See
notes 71-85 supra and accompanying text. This narrowing is consistent with the provision
of the Act which prevents the insured from recovering basic economic loss benefits from
the at-fault third party. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.51(1) (1976), as amended by Act of May
25, 1977, ch. 266, § 4, 1977 Minn. Laws 438. The limitation is also consistent with the pure
no-fault concept in that it limits the scope of the fault determination within the Act. Fault
need not be determined to the extent that neither the insurer nor the insured has a right
to recover the basic economic loss benefits from the at-fault third party.
172. See notes 174-76 infra and accompanying text.
173. See notes 177-79 infra and accompanying text.
174. See MINNESOTA AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY STUDY COMM'N, REPORT TO THE 1973
LEGISLATURE 79-81 (1973).
175. See id. at 80.
176. See Hill, Minority Report-Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act,
reprinted in National No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act: Hearings on S. 354 Before
the Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 122-23 (1973).
177. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.54(1) (1976).
178. See Grello v. Daszykowski, - App. Div. 2d __, , 397 N.Y.S.2d 396, 398
(1977) (no-fault law assures that every injured party will be compensated for all economic
losses suffered, promptly and without regard to fault).
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vided, the at-fault party becomes a favored insured because the losses
must be borne by the insurer of the party that suffered the losses,'79 thus
the injured party's premiums will rise.
Because of these fears, many states have included provisions for sub-
rogation and indemnity in a variety of forms in their no-fault plans.
Deterrence can be achieved, it is argued, by allowing indemnification
of an insurer after the injured parties have been compensated. 0 The
objective of immediate compensation to all injured parties, which is
basic to the no-fault concept, is retained.' The cost of compensating
for injury incurred, on the other hand, continues to be based on the
injury-causing capacity of the driver. Thus, automobile accidents and
the resultant injuries remain a cost to those involved in and causing
such accidents.
Other advantages to the modified no-fault plan, beyond immediate
compensation of the insured, exist. Most states make insurance manda-
tory, so, theoretically, every driver and passenger should be covered by
a no-fault policy.8 2 The system encourages rehabilitation of the injured
party, with prompt payment of out-of-pocket losses and elimination of
the right to bring a civil action against a third party in some instances.
3
Legal skills of counsel or lack thereof, sympathetic or hostile juries, or
the need of an injured party to "settle" to avoid financial ruin should
no longer play a role in a large percentage of the claims which arise out
of automobile accidents. Insurance benefits therefore should be distrib-
uted in a more equitable fashion than under the fault-based system.
B. The Opponents' Side
There are, however, disadvantages to the modified no-fault system,
and the question remains whether retention of the fault determination
has been beneficial. Problems of court congestion experienced under the
fault-based system remain."' An insurer promptly paying out basic eco-
nomic loss benefits must, in many instances, still expend money on
179. See Hill, supra note 176, at 123.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. Only four of the twenty-four states which have enacted no-fault compensation
systems do not make personal injury protection coverage compulsory. See ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 66-4015 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (coverage for basic economic loss benefits is compulsory
unless insured rejects such coverage in writing); S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. § 58-23-7 (Supp.
1977) (same); TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-3(a) (Vernon Pamphlet Supp. 1975-1976)
(same); VA. CODE § 38.1-380.1 (Supp. 1977) (basic economic loss benefit coverage must
be offered by the insurer although the insured is not required to purchase such coverage).
183. See notes 43-60 supra and accompanying text.
184. As long as recourse to the courts is allowed, whether the insured or the insurer is
pursuing the claim against the at-fault third party or its insurer, court congestion will be
a problem which must be solved. See generally R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, supra note 1,
at 13-15.
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investigation, negotiation, and court costs. These actions must be taken
by the insurer not only to secure reimbursement for itself, but as a
protective measure against other insurers who may also be seeking reim-
bursement for basic economic loss benefits paid to their insureds. To a
limited degree, arbitration rights will alleviate the problem of court
costs and extensive negotiations." The costs of investigation will re-
main, however, because the insurer will be required to establish that the
other insured was at fault in the accident.
The insured, under a modified no-fault system, must still retain full
liability coverage and now must pay additional sums for the first-party
benefits which are compulsory under the no-fault system.' 6 The insured
pays for the first-party benefits which are payable as loss accrues, the
cost of litigation of the subrogation or indemnity rights held by the
insurer, and the liability payments which must be made to the third
party or to the third party's insurer if the insured is adjudged to be at
fault.
Retention of the fault concept through use of subrogation and in-
demnity rights shifts the losses which arise out of motor vehicle acci-
dents and thus violates the closed system concept which no-fault plans
were originally intended to attain. 7 The closed system is perhaps most
effectively utilized in the workers' compensation area.'88 Injuries to
employees arising on the job are compensated from wholly within the
workers' compensation system. At least as between the employer and
employee, the insurance fund is the only recourse; there is no court liti-
gation, no battle over who is responsible for the injuries which have
occurred.1S9
185. See MINNESOTA AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY STUDY COMM'N, REPORT TO THE 1973
LEGISLATURE 81 (1973).
186. All states adopting pure or modified no-fault plans require the insured to purchase
both personal injury protection coverage and liability coverage. For a listing of states
enacting such plans, see note 37 supra.
187. See generally R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, supra note 1, at 257-60.
188. See generally 1 A. LARSON, THE LAw OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 1-2 (1972)
(social policy behind workers' compensation discussed).
189. See MINN. STAT. § 176.031 (1976). Provision is made under workers' compensation
law to shift some losses outside of the workers' compensation system. See MINN. STAT. §
176.061 (1976). Such shifting is allowed, however, only when the losses suffered have not
been caused by the employer-employee relationship, that is, have not been caused by the
system itself. For instance, if an employee suffers a broken leg from falling from a defective
scaffolding while painting a building, that employee will be entitled to recover workers'
compensation benefits because the injury occurred within the scope of employment. The
manufacturer of the defective scaffolding will still be liable for producing a defective
product. When subrogation and indemnity rights are granted under a no-fault plan, shift-
ing of losses outside of the system can occur although the losses arose out of the function-
ing of the system itself. For example, where broad subrogation rights are granted against
the at-fault party, the losses arising out of the motor vehicle accident may be compensated
by monies not raised by the automobile insurance system. The insurer in exercising its
subrogation right may claim virtually any assets of the at-fault party once it secures a
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Ideally, a no-fault automobile insurance plan should achieve the same
results as does workers' compensation.10 However, once a right of subro-
gation or indemnity is permitted, the system is no longer a closed one.
Losses may be and are paid from funds which are not raised solely by
insureds and insurers for the purposes of compensating accident vic-
tims. '9 Recourse may be had against a variety of individuals, both
through their insurance policies and against their personal income and
wealth. The litigation and disagreement which the workers' compensa-
tion system has effectively avoided is still present. Furthermore, the
insurance system does not bear the full responsibility for losses which
arise from motor vehicle accidents. 92
Requiring mandatory interinsurer arbitration of subrogation and in-
demnity claims eliminates some of the objections to their inclusion
within a no-fault plan. Adoption of mandatory interinsurer arbitration
to a no-fault plan statutorily limits the rights of subrogation and in-
demnity which an insurer is granted. All proceedings, which are against
the third party's insurer, are in front of an arbitrator who is responsible
for determining where fault lies and where responsibility should be
placed.
The inclusion of arbitration requirements in the modified no-fault
plan, however, is by no means a cure-all. The second round loss-shifting
by arbitration between insurers still costs insureds money. Dual cover-
age for primary basic economic loss benefits and third-party liability
coverage must still be maintained."' More importantly, the question of
the value of retaining the fault concept at all remains. A second question
is whether an arbitration panel is any more likely to be better able to
fix fault than a jury. The inherent problems of proof still remain.",
Not all of the above-outlined problems exist under the Minnesota
Act. The Minnesota Act avoids problems of court congestion and the
judgment against that party. Therefore, the losses are shifted outside of the no-fault
insurance system even though the losses arose out of a motor vehicle accident. The closed
system concept is violated without the policy reasons asserted for shifting losses outside
of the workers' compensation system.
190. See R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, supra note 1, at 257-60.
191. Reallocation of loss outside of the closed system does not occur where the indem-
nity right is granted against the at-fault party's insurer. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §
65B.53(1) (1976), as amended by Act of May 25, 1977, ch. 266, § 5, 1977 Minn. Laws 439.
192. See R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, supra note 1, at 257-60.
193. The Minnesota Act is an excellent example of the conflict. The Act requires an
insured to purchase basic economic loss coverage and liability coverage. See MINN. STAT.
§ 65B.48(1) (1976). The requirement of arbitration obviously does not eliminate the need
for dual coverage because the requirement of arbitration does not eliminate the determina-
tion of fault; it merely removes the fault determination from the courts. See notes 103-18
supra and accompanying text.
194. For a discussion of the inherent problems in proving fault, see National No-Fault
Motor Vehicle Insurance Act: Hearings on S. 354 Before the Comm. on Commerce, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 181-82 (1973).
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resulting costs of the litigation by granting subrogation rights to the
insurer only to prevent double recovery by the insured.' 5 Therefore, be-
cause the insured cannot recover basic economic loss benefits in acci-
dents occurring within the state, no subrogation right is necessary and
none exists. The limited indemnity right against the insurer of the com-
mercial vehicle whose driver is at fault in the accident also avoids these
problems by subjecting all such claims to arbitration. 6 To the extent
that subrogation and indemnity rights are granted, the other problems
with modified no-fault plans remain. The insured must purchase both
coverage for basic economic loss benefits and liability coverage." 7 Fur-
thermore, the question of the value of retaining the fault determination,
whether it be before an arbitration panel or in court, remains un-
answered.
Today more cars and trucks are on the highways than ever,' and the
number of deaths resulting from accidents is again on the rise. 9 In most
states, insurance premiums are higher than they have ever been.2 ® The
fault-based system has not checked this growth. The modified no-fault
systems which are still in their infancy, do not appear to have checked
the spiral either.10' Drivers' training courses, stricter penalties for intoxi-
cated drivers, and lower speed limits would appear to have a greater
chance of successfully reducing the number of automobile accidents and
the resulting injuries.2 2 The purpose of insurance should not be to solve
195. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.53(2)-(3) (1976).
196. See id. § 65B.53(4).
197. See id. § 65B.48().
198. The Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, has estimated
that 137,285,000 motor vehicles would be registered in the United States alone in 1976.
That figure represents an increase of almost five million registered vehicles over 1975
figures, and an increase of almost eight million over 1974. See MOTOR VEHICLE MFRS. Ass'N
OF THE U.S., INC., MOTOR VEHICLE FACTS & FIOURES '77, at 23 (1977).
199. The death toll on the nation's highways climbed steadily from 1943 to 1972 when
it reached a high of 56,278 deaths. See NAT'L SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 13 (1976).
A sharp decline in the number of deaths occurred between 1972 and 1975. Id. By 1976,
however, the number of deaths occurring in traffic accidents had started to climb again.
See MOTOR VEHICLE MFRS. Ass'N OF THE U.S., INC., MOTOR VEHICLE FACTS & FIGURES '77,
at 57 (1977). It should be noted, however, that the death rate, that is, the number of deaths
per 100,000 population, has declined from a rate of 27.7 in 1969 to a rate of 21.6 in 1975.
See id.; NAT'L SAFETY COUNCIL, supra at 13. The United States Department of Transporta-
tion attributes at least a portion of the decline in both the number of motor vehicle-related
deaths and in the death rate since 1973 to the implementation of the 55 mph speed limit.
See NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADM'N, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., 55 MPH FACT BOOK 3,
9 (1977).
200. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., STATE NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE EXPERIENCE
1971-1977, at 66-69 (1977).
201. For a general discussion of the impact and effectiveness of the new no-fault sys-
tems, see R. Henderson, Report on the Status and Effect of No-Fault Insurance Schemes
for Automobile Accidents in the United States (June 26, 1976) (report to Special Commit-
tee on UMVARA of the Nat'l Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws).
202. See generally No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance: Hearings on H.R. Con. Res. 241
Before the Subcomm. on Commerce & Finance of the Comm. on Interstate & Foreign
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the problem of preventing automobile accidents; it should be to com-
pensate the unfortunate victim of an accident.m No proof exists that the
fault concept built into the insurance system has actually deterred neg-
ligent driving conduct.2"'
C. The UMVARA Solution
In 1972, an alternative to both the fault-based system and the modi-
fied no-fault plans being utilized by the states was proposed by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Called
the Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reparation Act (UMVARA), 2" its
proposals, like those of the Basic Protection Plan of Robert Keeton and
Jeffrey O'Connell,2°" have had widespread effect on the no-fault plans
which have been adopted since 1972.2 7
Rights of subrogation and indemnity under UMVARA are severely
limited. Subrogation is allowed only to the extent that there may be
double recovery. 20" Similar to the Keeton and O'Connell provision, sub-
rogation is included to prevent double recovery in the areas where tort
liability remains in effect.2" Furthermore, UMVARA expressly prohibits
the insurer from directly or indirectly contracting for rights of reim-
bursement for or subrogation to a claim for general damages.210 A right
of indemnity is afforded against a person who has converted a motor
vehicle involved in the accident, or who is guilty of an intentional tort
causing the accident .
2
Commerce, 92d Cong., lst Sess. 1232-41 (1971) (statement of Richard B. Ogilvie).
203. See National No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act: Hearings on S. 354 Before
the Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 181 (1973).
204. See R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, supra note 1, at 247-49.
205. The full text of the proposal can be found at 13 UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED 349-441
(1975). The original work on UMVARA was commissioned by the United States Depart-
ment of Transportation and was formulated by a Special Drafting Committee of the
Conference.
206. See note 43 supra.
207. The Minnesota Senate adopted virtually intact the UMVARA proposal. See 2
MINN. S. JOUR. 2525-29 (1973). Although the Minnesota Act as adopted did not reflect the
total reliance that the senate placed on the UMVARA proposal, see note 67 supra, the
subsequent amendments to the Act are identical in substance, if not in effect, to the
UMVARA proposal. See note 211 infra.
208. See UMVARA § 6(b).
209. Compare UMVARA § 6 & Comment with R. KEETON & J. O'CoNNFL, supra note
1, at 306-07 (Motor Vehicle Basic Protection Insurance Act § 1.10) and id. at 402-06.
210. See UMVARA § 6(a).
211. See UMVARA § 6(c). The Minnesota Act's subrogation and indemnity provisions
are essentially similar to those of UMVARA. Subrogation is allowed only to the extent
that there would otherwise be double recovery, see MINN. STAT. § 65B.53(2)-(3) (1976),
the insurer is prohibited from contracting for rights of reimbursement or subrogation other
than those in the Act, see id. § 65B.53(6), and the insurer is entitled to exercise a subroga-
tion right to its insured's claim based on an intentional tort. See id. § 65B.53(3). The only
41
et al.: Subrogation and Indemnity Rights Under the Minnesota No-Fault Aut
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1978
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
Except for the very limited subrogation and indemnity rights outlined
above, the UMVARA plan makes no use of the fault concept. Premium
rates are based on the propensity of the vehicle, not the driver, to cause
injury."' Rates are determined according to statistics . 3 For example, if
eighty percent of the damage done in accidents over a year is caused by
one-ton trucks, then eighty percent of the benefits are paid by the insur-
ers of those trucks."' Each insurer is responsible for the portion of dam-
age caused in the state by all one-ton trucks which is equal to the
percentage of one-ton trucks which it insures. Therefore, the actual
damage caused by one insurer's vehicles in one year is not determina-
tive. If $1,000,000 in damage is caused by one-ton trucks over the year
and an insurer provides coverage for fifty percent of all one-ton trucks
in-the state, then that insurer must pay $500,000 in benefits during that
year. If actual payments made during the year exceed the insurer's
responsibility according to these statistics, provision is made for reallo-
cation of losses among the insurers.
2 15
Reallocation of losses is important in any system which rejects the
fault concept in distributing losses which accrue. Elimination of the
fault concept from the reparation system without allowing reallocation
difference between the two acts' provisions is in the manner in which the converter of a
motor vehicle is treated. Compare MINN. STAT. § 65B.58 (1976) with UMVARA § 6(c). The
Minnesota Act does not give the insurer any rights against the individual responsible for
converting a motor vehicle. Instead, the converter is not entitled to basic economic loss
benefits for any injuries sustained in the accident. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.58 (1976).
212. See UMVARA § 38(a).
213. See id. § 38(b).
214. See id. § 39, Comment.
215. An example should serve to make the procedure more clear. Insurance Companies
1 and 2 insure private passenger vehicles only. Each company insures 50% of those vehicles
in that state. Insurance Company 3, the only other insurance company in the state, insures
all other vehicles. According to the statistics compiled by the State Insurance Commis-
sioner, the amount of damage done by private passenger vehicles involved in accidents
equals 25% of the damage arising out of vehicular accidents each year in the state. The
remaining 75% of damage is caused by all other vehicles. At the end of year one, $1,000,000
in benefits have been paid out to insureds by the three insurance companies. Insurance
Companies 1 and 3 have each paid $500,000 in benefits, while Insurance Company 2 has
not paid any benefits. According to the Commissioner's statistics, however, Insurance
Companies 1 and 2 are each responsible for $125,000, with Insurance Company 3 responsi-
ble for the remainder. Consequently, Insurance Company 1 is entitled to reimbursement
from the other two insurance companies, with a reimbursement of $125,000 from Insurance
Company 2 and $250,000 from Insurance Company 3. By this procedure, losses are reallo-
cated according to the damage caused by the vehicles involved in the accident. The fear
that an insurer will not be able to meet claims made does not arise because insurance rates
are based on the injury-causing capacity of the vehicle, which is the same basis upon
which losses are reallocated. Therefore, the insurer should be able to predict with rela-
tively high accuracy the amount of benefits which it will be responsible for in any given
fiscal year. Additionally, the element of chance is removed in that payment of benefits is
no longer based upon which drivers are unlucky enough to be involved in a vehicular
accident.
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of losses among insurers would almost exactly reverse the present distri-
bution of payments made by liability carriers. " An estimated ninety
percent of the total compensation payments made under the fault-based
system are paid by the liability carriers of heavy commercial vehicles,
mainly trucks. " ' The great majority of those injured in motor vehicle
accidents, however, are occupants of private passenger vehicles."' Inju-
ries to those occupants are, on average, far more severe than injuries
suffered by the occupants of trucks involved in accidents." Thus, the
adoption of a pure no-fault plan would mean that no-fault insurers of
the private passenger vehicles will pay for the majority of losses.m Real-
location must take place or the heavy commercial vehicle will continue
to cause severe injuries to persons involved in accidents with it, but will
not pay its fair share for the losses the heavy commercial vehicle is
responsible for causing."'
Under the fault-based system, truck drivers commonly paid high in-
surance rates because at-fault truck drivers caused a substantial portion
of the damage occurring in motor vehicle accidents. Conceivably, with-
out reallocation, all the savings achieved by elimination of tort actions
arising out of the operation of motor vehicles could accrue to these truck
drivers. Although trucks cause significant damage and injury, the dam-
age and injury is generally suffered by the occupants of private passen-
ger vehicles. Premiums for private passenger vehicles would therefore
suffer large increases over levels existing under a fault-based system,
because their policies will pay for the injuries which they suffer in these
accidents, injuries which under the fault-based system would have been
allocated primarily to truck drivers. The UMVARA plan, therefore, pro-
vides for reallocation of losses and alters the method of determining
premium rates. No attempt is made to determine premium rates accord-
ing to the injury-causing capacity of the drivers. Instead, premiums
assessed are based on the injury and damage attributable to the vehicle
when it is involved in an accident, without regard to which party was
at fault.
UMVARA allocates costs of motor vehicle accidents without regard
to fault and without a case-by-case adjustment.m Reliance on the court
system is thereby eliminated. The expense of settling many claims, the
expense of separate investigations of each accident, and the marshalling
of evidence of fault are unnecessary. Losses become a burden of the
216. See UMVARA § 38, Comment.
217. Id.
218. See id.
219. Id.
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. See id., Commissioners' Prefatory Note.
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system, a cost of motoring in general which may be passed on through
the economic system. Losses are no longer a burden placed primarily
upon a select group of individuals who are the unfortunate victims of
a motor vehicle accident.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Minnesota Legislature made great strides in 1976 and 1977 in
restricting the subrogation and indemnity rights provided under the
Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act. These restrictions rep-
resent a continuing shift toward complete elimination of the relevance
of fault in the no-fault system. The time has come, however, to take the
final step and adopt the UMVARA approach, thus removing completely
the fault determination under the No-Fault Act. Accident losses then
would become a cost to all motor vehicle operators. With virtually no
exceptions, motor vehicles which cause most of the damage, regardless
of fault, then would be accountable for the damage they cause. More-
over, the additional costs resulting from the need to determine fault in
each individual case would be eliminated. Under an UMVARA system,
therefore, injured parties could be adequately compensated at a lower
cost to both the insurance industry and the motoring public.
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